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I.  The Vulnerable Foundations of Modern Society
In the developed world at the beginning of the 21st century, life is built upon
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1 “Credit card transactions, magazine subscriptions, telephone numbers, real estate
records, automobile registrations, consumer surveys, warranty registrations, credit reports, and
Internet web sites are all sources of personal information . . . .”  LA. REV. STAT. § 51:3072, La.
Legis. 499 (2005) (legislative finding).  “[B]usinesses and governments share everything from
marketing lists to property records on the Internet.”  Stop Thieves from Stealing You, CONSUMER
REPORTS, Oct. 2003, at 12 (hereinafter cited as “Stop Thieves”).
2 According to one source, “hacker” means “an unauthorized user who attempts to or
gains access to an information system and the data it supports.”  Information Security Glossary
Terms, at http://www.key.com/html/A-11.2.1.html#H (last visited July 24, 2005).  See also Eric
J. Sinrod & William P. Reilly, Cyber-Crimes: A Practical Approach to the Application of
Federal Computer Crime Laws, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 177, 182-88
(2000) (discussing “hackers” and “crackers”–the latter being hackers with criminal intent).  In
this article, unless context indicates otherwise, “hacker” means an “outside” unauthorized user.  
“One of the greatest threats to the security of client computers is not the hacker, but the enemy
within:  trusted company employees, ex-employees, consultants, or other insiders familiar with
the computer network.”  Michael L. Rustad, Private Enforcement of Cybercrime on the
Electronic Frontier, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 63, 76 (2001).  The term “data intruder” is used
here to encompass both hackers and insiders without authorization to access data at the time or
for the purposes that efforts to gain access are made.
State security breach notifications laws, discussed in Parts II-B-2 and III-A, have been
passed to respond to the risks of harm caused by hackers and other intruders.  Their application
frequently pivots on a definition of “security breach.”  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(d)
(Westlaw current through Ch. 33 of 2005 Reg. Sess. urgency legislation & Gov. Reorg. Plan No.
2 of 2005) (defining a breach of security of a database as “unauthorized acquisition of
computerized data that compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal
information maintained by the person or business”).  The terms data intrusion and security
breach are sometimes used synonymously here.
computerized databases.  Those electronic troves contain a vast range of information about
virtually all persons who interact (voluntarily or involuntarily) with the institutions of society.  A
myriad of entities, including businesses, non-profit organizations, and the government, assemble,
update, manage, and use masses of computerized information relating to individuals.1 The data
often include, but certainly are not limited to, names, relationships (e.g., family members and
employers), contact information (e.g., phone numbers, residences, and virtual addresses),
personal histories (e.g., birth dates, medical data, physical characteristics, and educational
records), official identifiers (e.g., social security, driver’s license, and passport numbers), and
financial records (e.g., bank, credit card, frequent flyer, and investment account numbers). 
Without such databases, virtually all types of enterprises would operate much less efficiently
than they do today.
 
When information contained in computerized databases is hacked2 or otherwise
improperly accessed the consequences can be devastating for the persons to whom the
information relates (data subjects).  Among the more obvious risks is the possibility that an
Page 3
3 See generally Anthony E. White,  The Recognition of a Negligence Cause of Action for
Victims of Identity Theft:  Someone Stole My Identity, Now Who Is Going to Pay for It?, 88
MARQ. L. REV. 847, 851-52 (2005) (discussing “account takeovers” and “true name fraud”); R.
Bradley McMahon, After Billions Spent to Comply with HIPAA and GLBA Privacy Provisions,
Why Is Identity Theft the Most Prevalent Crime in America?, 49 Vill. L. Rev. 625, 627 (2004)
(discussing how identity theft occurs); see also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FEDERAL AND
STATE TRENDS IN FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT JANUARY TO DECEMBER, 2004 (2005), available
at http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel/pubs/Top10Fraud2004.pdf (last visited July 25, 2005)
(gathering statistics).
4 Texas Bill Analysis, 2005 Reg. Sess. Sen. Bill 122, available in Westlaw at Tx. B. An.,
S.B. 122, 4/7/2005 (reporting that “[v]ictims spend an average of 600 hours over two to four
years and $1,400 to clear their names”).
5 Identity Theft at http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft (stating that as a result of identity
theft “victims may lose job opportunities, be refused loans, education, housing or cars, or even
get arrested for crimes they didn’t commit”) (hereinafter “FTC website”). For example, a hacker
may be able to access an admissions application, change the data submitted online, and thereby
reduce the applicant’s chances of being accepted.  Cf. Robert Lemos, USC admissions site
cracked wide open, THE REGISTER, July 7, 2005, available at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/07/06/usc_site_cracked  (last visited July 8, 2005) (discussing
a flaw in a university application system that “left the personal information of users publicly
accessible”).
6 Cf. Rustad, , supra note 2, 6, at 100 (reporting that “[a] former chemistry graduate
student found a security flaw in a commercial website and demanded ransom payments to keep
quiet about it”).
7 Cf. Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003).  Remsburg is discussed
in the text beginning at note 233.
8 See Rustad, supra note 2, 6, at 65.
9 See, e.g., University to Warn Web Users of Security Breach by Hackers, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2005, at 15, col. 1 (discussing plans by the University of Southern California to notify
270,000 persons that hacking occurred).; John C. Ensslin, 2 CU Computers Hacked, ROCKY MT.
NEWS, July 22, 2005, available at
http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/education/article/0,1299,DRMN_957_3945801,00.ht
ml (discussing security breaches at the University of Colorado that exposed the personal data of
42,900 students, faculty, and staff members).  See also DELOITTE, 2004 GLOBAL SECURITY
SURVEY 24 (2004), available at http://dtt_financialservices_SecuritySurvey2004_051704.pdf
affected individual will become a victim of identity theft3 and will suffer ruinous losses to credit
and reputation, emotional distress, inconvenience, out-of-pocket expenses,4 and perhaps even
lost opportunities.5 In more extreme cases, the individual to whom the information pertains may
be stalked by an assailant, blackmailed,6 or physically harmed.7 The sources of unauthorized
data access are diverse.  “The perpetrators of computer intrusions may be bored juveniles,
disgruntled employees, corporate spies, or organized crime networks,”8 not to mention run-of-
the-mill thieves. 
News reports about hacking are now common.9 Such breaches of data security often
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(last visited Aug 2, 2004) (reporting that a survey of major global financial institutions revealed
that 83% reported a breach of computer security during the last year, and that while “outside
intrusions were more common from those on the inside,” the majority of respondents
experienced both). 
10 Cf. Eric Dash, Europe Zips Lips; U.S. Sells Zips, N.Y. TIMES, Sun. Aug. 7, 2005, at
sec. 4, p.1. (stating that in 2005, “the personal information of more than 50 million consumers
has been lost, stolen and even sold to thieves”); Eric Dash, Credit Card Ads Place Renewed
Focus on Security, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2005 (indicating that Bank of America reported in
February 2005 that it had lost data tapes containing millions of its customers’ records”);  Lemos,
supra note 5, (discussing a flaw in an online university application system that “put at risk
‘hundreds of thousands’ of records containing personal information”); Melissa Sanchez, Breach
Exposes School Records, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Tues. Aug. 9, 2005 (discussing a breach
of security at the University of North Texas which compromised data relating to more than
38,000 present, former, and prospective students); Calif. Bill Analysis, Senate Floor, 2001-2002
Regular Session, Assembly Bill 700, Aug. 22, 2002, available in Westlaw at CA B. An., A.B.
700 Sen., 8/22/2002 (reporting that “computer hackers were able to illegally access sensitive
financial and personal information, including Social Security numbers, of approximately
265,000 state workers”).
11 See David B. Reddick, National Assoc. of Mut. Ins. Cos., Security Breach
Notification Laws, 1 ISSUE BRIEF No. 3, at 2 (Jul. 7, 2005) (indicating that during a recent year
more than 10 million persons were victims of identity theft, which “topped the FTC’s annual
complaints list for the fifth year in a row”), available at
http://www.namic.org/insbriefs/050707SecurityBreach.pdf.
threaten the interests of hundreds or thousands of persons simultaneously.10 Because database
use is ubiquitous, virtually everyone is a potential victim.11
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12 See Jason Krause, The Case of the Ethical Hacker, 2 No. 44 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 2
(Nov. 2003), available in Westlaw at 2 No. 44 ABAJEREP 2 (discussing criminal liability under
the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act); Current Development, Federal Jury Convicts
Smart-Card Hacker for Violating DMCA, 20 No. 12 INTERNET & COMPUTER LAW. 28 (2003)
(discussing the first hacker conviction under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act).  See also
CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND THE LAW: AN OVERVIEW OF KEY
ISSUES 37-39 (Stewart D. Personick et al. eds., 2003), at
http://books.nap.edu/html/ciip/index.html [hereinafter CRITICAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE] (briefly discussing the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, and the USA Patriot Act, as well as fraud in connection with
“access devices” and interception of communications); Brent Wibel,  A Site Where Hackers Are
Welcome: Using Hack-in Contests to Shape Preferences and Deter Computer Crime, 112 YALE
L.J. 1577 (2003) (discussing computer crime involving unwarranted intrusions into private
computer networks).  Hackers who misuse improperly accessed personal information may also
be subject to liability under the identity-theft laws.  See White, supra note 3, at 856 (indicating
that 44 states have identity-theft statutes and that, in 1998, Congress passed the Identity Theft
and Deterrence Act). 
13 See Rustad, supra note 2, 6, at 66 (predicting that “[t]ort remedies . . . will play an
increasingly important role in punishing and deterring fraud, hacking, and other wrongdoing on
the Internet”).
14 See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Cybertorts and Legal Lag: an Empirical
Analysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77, 85 (2003) (stating that “[h]ardly a day goes by without
new media reports of cyberspace wrongs, yet plaintiff victories remain rare”).  Whether there is
something to be said on behalf of hackers to mitigate or avoid liability is a subject of debate. 
According to “the main principles of hacking . . . information should circulate as widely as
possible.”  Nicholas Thompson, Who Needs Keys? Hackers Learn How to Trespass the
Old-Fashioned Way—From a Lockpicker, 2004-Dec. LEGAL AFF. 8. See also Krause, supra
note 12, at 2 (stating that “[o]ne of the activities that defines the hacker community is the process
of looking for software security holes and publishing details of security flaws on the Web.  .  .  .
Some argue this research is a kind of peer review that is vital to computer science”); Wibel,
supra note 12, at 1589-92 (discussing the transformation of hacker culture and stressing the need
to “rebuild a community of hackers in which a body of positive social norms can be sustained”).
15 See Rustad, supra note 2, 6, at 114 (opining that “a virus that destroys a hard drive
might be conceptualized as the tort of conversion”).
16 See id. at 106 (stating that “[c]ourts have held that a hacker’s intrusion into a computer
network constitutes a trespass to chattels”).
17 See Shannon Duffy, Law Firm Accused of Hacking, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July
14, 2005, at http://www.law.com/jsp/ltn/pubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1121245509109 (last visited
July 19, 2005) (discussing a suit against a law firm for copyright infringement, civil conspiracy,
trespass to chattels, trespass for conversion and intrusion upon seclusion).
Hackers and other data intruders are subject to criminal12 and civil liability.13 They can
be sued, sometimes successfully,14 under a variety of tort theories, including conversion,15
trespass to chattels,16 and intrusion upon private affairs,17 as well as under the civil liability
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18 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (Westlaw current through P.L. 109-18, approved June 29, 2005)
(stating in part that “[a]ny person who suffers damage . . . may maintain a civil action against the
violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief”).  See
generally Rustad, supra note 2, 6, at 89-91 (describing the CFFA).
19 See Ensslin, supra note 9 (discussing attacks traced to France and Eastern Europe);
Rustad, supra note 2, 6, at 74 (stating that the “Russian Republics have been a popular venue for
innovative cyberscams involving credit card numbers stolen from websites”); Calif. Bill
Analysis, Senate Floor, 2001-2002 Regular Session, Assembly Bill 700, Aug. 22, 2002,
available in Westlaw at CA B. An., A.B. 700 Sen., 8/22/2002 (discussing use of hacked data by
“unauthorized persons in Germany”).
20 See Wibel, supra note 12, at 1582 (asserting that “hackers tend to be judgment
proof”).
21 There is an important initial terminological question relating cybersecurity tort
liability:  if there is to be a duty of care and a risk of liability, on whom should the duty and risk
be imposed?  Should the analysis focus on the obligations of database owners, or database
possessors, or some other class of persons?  This article speaks in terms of the duty and liability
of database “possessors,” on the assumption that a party in possession of the data has the
opportunity to exercise care.  The term would include owners or licensees in possession of data
and perhaps others.  The choice to focus on possession of data finds analogical support in the law
of premises liability, which generally imposes duties and liability on the party in possession of
the premises at the time the harm occurred.  (For example, a lessor not in possession of a leased
premises, in many states, is subject to only limited liability.  See, e.g., Clauson v. Kempffer, 477
N.W.2d 257 (S.D. 1991) (holding that a landlord had no duty to warn a motorcyclist of a smooth
wire fence that tenants strung across a road on a leased premises).)  However, a legislature or
court might elect to speak in other terms.  State security breach notification statutes generally
only require data owners or licensors to notify data subjects that unauthorized access to data has
occurred.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5 (Westlaw current through Ch. 33 of 2005 Reg.
Sess. urgency legislation & Gov. Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 2005) (imposing obligations on a
“business that owns to licenses personal information”); 2005 TENN. LAWS PUB. CH. 473 §§
1(a)(2) & (b) (S.B. 2220), Tn. Legis. 473 (2005) (imposing obligations on an “information
holder,” which is defined as a business or state agency that “that owns or licenses computerized
data that includes personal information”).   State security breach notification laws generally
oblige database possessors who do not own the data that has been breached to disclose the
intrusion to the owner of the data, rather than the data subject.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(b)
(Westlaw current through Ch. 33 of 2005 Reg. Sess. urgency legislation & Gov. Reorg. Plan No.
2 of 2005) (imposing obligations on a “business that owns to licenses personal information”)
(stating that “[a]ny person or business that maintains computerized data that includes personal
information that the person or business does not own shall notify the owner or licensee of the
information of any breach of the security of the data immediately following discovery, if the
personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized
provisions of the federal Computer Fraud & Abuse Act.18 However, hackers (particularly those
located in other countries19) may be difficult to identify or subject to court jurisdiction.  Hackers
may also be judgment proof.20 A better target for a lawsuit–one easier to locate, more amenable
to legal process, and perhaps more solvent–may be the database possessor21 who failed to
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person”).
22 See Robert Steinberg, Advising Clients About Hacker Insurance, L.A. LAW., Feb.
2003, at 60, available in Westlaw at 25-Feb. L.A. Law. 60 (opining that “[f]or corporations with
well-known brand names, in high visibility industries, with significant Web presences, or
sensitive information, a single breach, with the potential for third-party claims, can be financially
devastating”).  See also Ethan Preston & Paul Turner, The Global Rise of a Duty to Disclose
Information Security Breaches, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 457, 491 (2004)
(reporting that “[o]ne study found that publicly-traded firms which disclosed security breaches
lost 2.1% of their market value within two days of the disclosure”).
23 See, e.g., Parke v. Cardsystems Solutions, Inc., No. CGC - 05 - 442624 (CA. Super Ct.
filed June 24, 2005) (alleging, in a class action, that information relating to 40 million credit card
accounts was accessed by hackers and that the defendants had failed to protect the data or
promptly notify data subjects about the breach); Goldberg v. ChoicePoint Inc., No. BC329115
(Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 18, 2005) (alleging, in a class action involving 145,000 persons, that
the defendants failed to protect personal data, failed to promptly notify data subjects of the
breach, engaged in unfair business practices, and committed fraud and negligent
misrepresentation).  See also Laura Mahoney, Identity Theft Class Action Filed Against
ChoicePoint as AG Launches Investigation into Breach, 6 COMPUTER TECH. L. REP. Mar. 4,
2005 (indicating that the state was “tracking about 4 cases that have been significant in size”).
24 See Jane Strachan, Cybersecurity Obligations, 20 ME. B.J. 90 (2005) (discussing how
to advise business clients in light of “[t]oday’s. . . risk of a lawsuit or regulatory enforcement
arising from inadequate information security practices”).
25 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-101, et seq., Ar. Legis. 1526 (2005); CAL. CIV. CODE §
1798.81.5 et seq. (Westlaw current through Ch. 33 of 2005 Reg. Sess. urgency legislation &
Gov. Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 2005); 2005 CONN. LEGIS. SERV. P.A. 05-148 (S.S.B. 650), Ct. Legis.
P.A. 05-148; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-101 et seq., De. Legis. 61 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
817.5681 et seq., Fl. Legis. 2005-229; GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-910 et seq., Ga. Legis. 163 (2005);
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 530/1 et seq., Il. Legis. 94-36 (2005); IND. CODE § 4-1-11-1 et seq., In.
prevent or reveal the security breach, rather than the intruder.
Whether and to what extent a database possessor can be held liable for damages suffered
by data subjects as a result of improper data access are questions of huge importance.  On one
hand, unless some form of liability is imposed, the persons often in the best position to prevent
the losses may have insufficient incentive to exercise care to avoid unnecessary harm.  On the
other hand, if liability is too readily assessed, it will have the power to bankrupt valuable
enterprises because of the often vast numbers of potential plaintiffs and consequent extensive
resulting damages.22 Obviously, a balance must be struck that adequately protects the interests
of individuals without discouraging the use of computer technology or driving important
institutions out of existence.
Cases are now being litigated over the liability of database possessors,23 and lawyers are
starting to advise clients about the risk of being held accountable for harm caused by hackers and
other intruders.24 However, despite the recent enactment of security breach notification statutes
in at least fifteen states,25 the law governing database possessor liability is far from settled. 
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Legis. 91-2005 (2005); LA. REV. STAT. § 51:3071 et seq., La. Legis. 499 (2005); ME. REV. STAT.
§ 1346 et seq., Me. Legis. 379 (2005); MINN. STAT. § 325E.61 et seq., Mn. Legis. 167 (2005);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-3-115(5), Mt. Legis. 518 (2005); 2005 NEV. LAWS Ch. 486 (A.B. 334),
§§ 4 & 6, Nv. Legis. 486 (2005) (slip copy) and 2005 Nevada Laws Ch. 485 (S.B. 347), § 17 et
seq., Nv. Legis. 485 (2005) (slip copy); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-01 et seq., N.D. Legis. 447
(2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 11-49.2-1 et seq., R.I. Legis. 05-225; 2005 TENN. LAWS PUB. CH. 473
(S.B. 2220), Tn. Legis. 473 (2005); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 48.001 et seq., Tx. Legis. 294
(2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17 et seq., Wa. Legis. 368 (2005).  See generally Reddick, supra
note 4, at 1-5 (analyzing security breach notification laws for an insurance trade association).
26 A database possessor may “lose” the personal information of others in a variety of
ways:  for example, (1) by failing to protect the information from hackers and other intruders; (2)
by erroneously releasing the information to third persons; or (3) by simply misplacing the data. 
In one sense, these three forms of data loss each involve alleged failure to exercise reasonable
case, and in that respect may be nothing more than different examples of negligent data
handling.  However, on closer scrutiny, the three types of data loss identified above may be
legally distinguishable.  Failure to guard against intruders raises the issue of whether there is a
duty to undertake what amounts to crime fighting efforts–which is a point of some controversy. 
See Dupont v. Aavid Thermal Tech., Inc., 798 A.2d 587, 592 (N.H. 2002) (holding that there is
no broad duty on an employer to protect an employee from foreseeable crimes because “the
general duty to protect citizens from criminal attacks is a government function”).  In contrast, the
duty to protect third persons from criminal intruders is not a significant concern in cases
involving erroneous release or careless loss of data.  Similarly, when the wrong data has been
published erroneously, there has been an exercise (albeit an imprudent exercise) of first
amendment rights to free speech or free press.  The constitutional principles that have evolved to
constrain the imposition of tort liability for utterances resulting in defamation or incitement
might arguably also limit the levying of tort liability for erroneous publication of data that causes
harm.  However, those same principles would have no application in suits involving hacked or
misplaced data, because in those situations there was never an intent on the part of the database
possessor to speak or publish anything.  Tort literature has not yet fully explored the issues
relating to these various types of data loss.  This article is primarily concerned with a database
possessor’s duty to protect data from intruders.
There is considerable uncertainty about the reach of the new state laws and related concerns,
including what types of damages might be recovered in tort actions involving data intrusion. 
This article addresses three key questions relating to database possessor liability for harm caused
by data intruders.26
The first issue, considered in Part II, is whether database possessors have a legal duty to
data subjects to safeguard their personal information from unauthorized access by hackers or
others.  The discussion addresses the obligations imposed by statutes, ordinary tort principles
(including the rules on voluntary assumption of duty), and fiduciary-duty law.  The article
concludes that, in a wide range of circumstances, database possessors are (or should be) legally
obliged to data subjects to exercise reasonable care to safeguard personal data from intruders. 
However, as discussed below, the precise theory under which such a duty is imposed may have
important implications for defining the scope of liability.
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27 See, e g., McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 468 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding
that the failure to correct earlier true statements, which has become false or misleading, was
fraudulent).
28 See RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM  § 39
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing duty based on prior conduct).
29 See generally Jay M. Feinman, Doctrinal Classification and Economic Negligence, 33
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137, 146 (1996) (stating that “the economic loss rule distinguishes purely
pecuniary losses from losses due to personal injury or property damage losses as the criterion
that governs the classification of cases.  Economic losses are losses due to disappointed
expectations, and should therefore be governed by contract law; only losses due to personal
injury or property damage, which generally are not the subject of prior bargaining and which
invoke public safety concerns, are within the realm of tort law”).
The next issue, considered in Part III, concerns not whether there is a duty to protect
computerized information from intruders, but whether a database possessor is obliged to disclose
evidence of a security breach to data subjects once an intrusion occurs.  The discussion considers
statutory obligations, as well as basic tort principles.  The relevant legislation includes the
security breach notification laws recently passed in many states.  Pertinent common-law
guidance encompasses the basic principles of negligence liability and two specific rules that
warrant special attention.  The first rule, under the law of misrepresentation, imposes a duty to
update previously accurate statements that are the basis for pending or continuing reliance.27 
This rule is relevant because a breach of data security may cast substantial doubt on the
continuing accuracy of expansive statements about data security that are often contained in
business advertisements or published privacy policies.  The second rule, under failure-to-act
jurisprudence, creates a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm or minimize adverse
consequences if one’s prior conduct, “even though not tortious,” creates a continuing risk of
physical harm.28 This rule may be relevant because the security practices of database possessors,
even if not negligent, often contribute to the success of hackers and other intruders.  Finally, the
heightened candor obligations imposed by fiduciary-duty law are considered.  The article
concludes that in many situations there is (or should be) a duty, enforceable in a tort action for
damages, to inform data subjects that the security of their data has been compromised.
The final key issue, addressed in Part IV, concerns how far the liability of a database
possessor should extend in cases where the possessor has failed to exercise reasonable care to
protect data or disclose information about intrusion.  The discussion first considers the
economic-loss rule29 and concludes that it presents an important, but limited, obstacle to
recovery of tort damages.  Under certain circumstances, economic damages caused by identity
theft resulting from improperly accessed data should be recoverable  The article then addresses
the issue of emotional distress damages and considers the arguments favoring limited liability
for this type of loss in cybersecurity litigation.  Attention is paid to the guidance that has
emerged from the courts in fear-of-disease cases, and the article recommends adapting those
principles to the context of improperly accessed data.  Emotional-distress damages should be
available only to those plaintiffs whose data was actually accessed by an intruder, and not to
those whose data was merely exposed to a risk of unauthorized access.  Lastly, the article argues
that, in the absence of aggravated tortious conduct (e.g., recklessness or worse), the interests of
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30 “In the context of a toxic exposure action, a claim for medical monitoring seeks to
recover the cost of future periodic medical examinations intended to facilitate early detection and
treatment of disease caused by a plaintiff’s exposure to toxic substances.”  Potter v. Firestone
Tire and Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 821 (Cal. 1993).  See also Badillo v. American Brands, Inc.,
16 P.3d 435, 439 (Nev. 2001) (noting that “a growing number of appellate courts have
recognized medical monitoring (seventeen states plus the District of Columbia)”).
31 See Rustad, supra note 2, 6, at 108 (stating that “[a] hospital has a statutory duty to
protect the privacy of its patients’ records”).
32 See RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 cmt. b
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1) (discussing express and implied statutory causes of action).
33 Sometimes courts find that there is an “implicit” legislative intent to create a civil
cause of action; other times they simply hold that the statute is an appropriate expression of the
standard of care.  See VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW
305-06 (3d ed. 2005) (stating that “[i]n the one case, the court is saying that the legislation sets
the standard because the legislature implicitly intended it to do so, and in the other case, the
court acknowledges that the statutes sets the standard because the court thinks that is a good
idea.  Either way, if the statute does not expressly create a cause of action, the essential inquiry is
the same:  was the law intended to protect this class of persons from this type of harm”).
society will be best served by limiting recoverable losses to the cost of “security-monitoring”
damages once a database possessor discloses to the affected individual the fact that data has been
improperly accessed.  This approach will encourage database possessors to discover and reveal
instances of data intrusion.  It will also place data subjects in a position to protect their own
interests by monitoring their economic and personal security when there is heightened
vulnerability.  This proposal relating to security-monitoring damages is similar in concept to
medical-monitoring damages,30 a type of loss that many states permit victims of toxic exposure
to recover.  The proposed limitation on liability will encourage the exercise of care by both
database possessors and data subjects, while at the same time minimizing the risk of imposing
the type of extensive tort damages that would discourage the use of computer technology or
assess disproportionate liability. 
II.  The Duty to Protect Database Information
Tort liability depends upon the existence of a legal duty to exercise care running from the
defendant (the database possessor) to the plaintiff (the data subject).  Such a duty may be
imposed either by statute or by common law.  The following sections discuss legislation bearing
on the question of whether there is a tort duty to safeguard the security of computerized personal
data and two obvious sources of common-law guidance, ordinary tort principles and fiduciary-
duty law.
A.  Statutes Legislatively Creating a Cause of Action
A duty to exercise care to protect data from intruders may be imposed by statute,31 either
by the express terms of the legislation32 or because a court holds that a statute that is silent as to
civil liability sets the appropriate standard of care for a tort action.33 This subpart discusses
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34 See, e.g., Preston & Turner, supra note page 7, at 461-63.
35 See Reddick, supra note 11, at 2 (stating point).
36 See Reddick, supra note 11, at 1 (indicating that “most new laws follow the SBIA”).   
37 See Part III-A (discussing notification laws).
38 See Daniel J. McCoy, Recent Privacy Law Developments Affecting the Workplace,
788 PLI/PAT 435,  489 (May 2004) (discussing the California law).
39 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5 (Westlaw current through Ch. 33 of 2005 Reg. Sess.
urgency legislation & Gov. Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 2005).  The term “business” is defined broadly
by the statute.  See id. at § 1798.80(a).  However, § 1798.81.5 does not apply to certain specified
entities, including, among others, certain health care providers and financial institutions.  See id.
at § 1798.81.5(e).  The obligations imposed by the California statute reach “well beyond
California’s borders, potentially affecting any company, person or agency that has a computer
database containing any California resident’s ‘personal information.’”  Tyler Paetkau &
Roxanne Torabian-Bashardoust, California Deals with ID Theft, 13-Jun. BUS. L. TODAY 37
(2004).  Importantly, “the law only applies when an individual’s ‘unencrypted data’ is at issue.” 
Id. at 41.
statutes that expressly create a civil cause of action based on lack of data security.  The next
subpart discusses statutes which do not create a tort cause of action, but might be judicially
embraced as setting the standard of care for suits involving allegedly negligent failure to
safeguard computerized personal data.
An important example of legislation expressly creating a civil cause of action for failure
to protect data is California’s much-discussed34 Security Breach Information Act (SBIA).  The
SBIA was the first law in the United States to impose on businesses a duty to inform data
subjects of unauthorized intrusion into their personal data.35 The California act has served as a
model for legislation subsequently adopted in other jurisdictions.36 The various state laws are
animated by mutual concerns and often share a common language and structure.  The laws all
impose a duty to reveal information about security breaches.37 However, the statutes differ in
important respects.  One key difference concerns whether the statutes expressly impose a duty to
protect data (in addition to the notification duty).  Another key difference is whether a breach of
the duties imposed by the act is expressly actionable in a private lawsuit.
The California SBIA imposes a data protection obligation and expressly authorizes
maintenance of a suit for damages for breach of that duty.  The relevant language, which became
effective July 1, 2003,38 states that:
(b)  A business that owns or licenses personal information about a California
resident shall implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices
appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect the personal information from
unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.39
The legislation further provides that:
(b) Any customer injured by a violation of this title may institute a civil action to
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40 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84 (Westlaw current through Ch. 33 of 2005 Reg. Sess.
urgency legislation & Gov. Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 2005). 
41 Id. at § 1798.81.5.
42 Id.
43 The fact that liability is rooted in negligence may mean that an action is subject to a
comparative negligence defense.  See RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR
PHYSICAL HARM § 14 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (stating that in dealing with a
liability right expressly created by a statute, “the court may need to consider whether traditional
tort defenses such as comparative negligence should be deemed impliedly incorporated into the
statutory cause of action).  But see Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 811-13 (Minn. 1981)
(discussing situations where statutes impose “absolute” liability).
44 While adoption of the SBIA was pending, the Information Technology Association of
America (ITAA) wrote to the state Senate Committee on Privacy and raised the “specter of
lawsuits targeting companies for even innocent mistakes” and requested amendments to “cap the
liability exposure.”  Calif. Bill Analysis, Senate Floor, 2001-2002 Regular Session, Assembly
Bill 700, Aug. 22, 2002, available in Westlaw at CA B. An., A.B. 700 Sen., 8/22/2002. 
However, the ITAA offered no suggestion for how to effectuate such a cap, and the Committee
report simply notes that “AB 700 does not create any new penalty in law.”  Id. 
recover damages.40
The SBIA leaves no doubt that businesses owe a legal duty to customers under California
law to protect their personal information, and that, if the duty is breached, damages may be
recovered.  It is also clear that the civil actions which the California legislature has told the
courts to entertain are rooted in principles of negligence (rather than, for example, strict liability
or recklessness), for the law speaks of “reasonable security procedures and practices”41 that are
“appropriate to the nature of the information.”42 Reasonableness assessed under the
circumstances is the essence of the negligence standard of care.  Only unreasonable (i.e.,
negligent) conduct violates the California SBIA.  However, beyond offering clear guidance
regarding the existence of duty and the liability regime,43 the SBIA leaves many matters
unsettled.  The act makes no attempt to define what constitutes “reasonable security procedures
and practices.”  Presumably that assessment is left to the finder of fact for determination on a
case by case basis.  More importantly, the SBIA gives no indication as to what types of damages
are recoverable.44 Whether those damages include compensation for personal injury, property
damage, emotional distress, economic loss, or other types of harm is left unresolved.  If the
legislature intended for courts to allow recovery of the “usual” types of damages that may be
awarded in negligence suits, the scope of damages, as discussed in Part IV, may be more limited
than might first appear.
B. Statutes Judicially Determined to Set the Standard of Care
Some statutes addressing issues relating to data protection do not expressly create a civil
cause of action.  In this category are the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization
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45 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
46 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. 6801(a)  (Westlaw current through P.L.
109-34, approved July 12, 2005) (emphasis added).
47 Id. at 15 U.S.C. 6805 (defining entities and roles).  See also id. at 15 U.S.C.A. § 6825
(stating that each Federal banking agency . . . , the National Credit Union Administration, and
the Securities and Exchange Commission or self-regulatory organizations, as appropriate, shall
review regulations and guidelines applicable to financial institutions under their respective
jurisdictions and shall prescribe such revisions to such regulations and guidelines as may be
necessary to ensure that such financial institutions have policies, procedures, and controls in
place to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of customer financial information and to deter and
detect . . .  [the solicitation or obtaining of customer information by false pretenses]”).
48 Id. at 15 U.S.C. 6801(b) (discussing establishment of regulations).
49 Id. at 15 U.S.C. 6805(a) (providing that regulations shall be “enforced by the Federal
functional regulators, the State insurance authorities, and the Federal Trade Commission with
respect to financial institutions and other persons subject to their jurisdiction”).
50 “Financial institutions under the Act include everything from real estate appraisers to
automobile dealerships.”  McMahon, supra note 3, at 634-35.
51 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. 6801(b)  (Westlaw current through P.L.
109-34, approved July 12, 2005) .
52 Id. (emphasis added).
53 Julia C. Schiller, Comment, Informational Privacy v. The Commercial Speech
Doctrine:  Can the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Provide Adequate Privacy Protection?, 11
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 349, 356 (2003) (stating that “[t]he GLB Act . . . does not provide for a
private right of action for consumers to sue the financial institution directly for violation of the
statute”).   “The consumer must complain to the agency having jurisdiction over them and that
Act of 199945 (“GLBA”) and certain state security breach notification laws.  These various
pieces of legislation are discussed in the following subparts.  
1. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
The GLBA states that it is “the policy of the Congress that each financial institution has
an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect
the security and confidentiality of those customers’ nonpublic personal information.”46 In
furtherance of that policy, a significant number of state and federal governmental entities47 are
required to establish48 and enforce49 “appropriate standards for the financial institutions50
subject to their jurisdiction.”51 Those standards must provide “administrative, technical, and
physical safeguards–(1) to insure the security and confidentiality of customer records and
information; (2) to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity
of such records; and (3) to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such records or
information which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.”52
The GLBA does not expressly create a civil cause of action against financial institutions
for breach of their duty to protect customer information.53 However, it has been suggested54 that
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agency may bring a court action against the financial institution.  However, some state laws,
such as the Unfair and Deceptive Practice Laws, may enable the consumer to claim that a
violation of the GLBA violated other rights granted to the individual by the state.”  Id. 
54 See White, supra note footnote 3, at 865 (discussing negligence per se under the
GLBA).
55 See generally RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing negligence per se).  In most jurisdictions, the
unexcused violation of a standard-setting statute is conclusive proof of breach of duty, called
negligence per se (see generally RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM § 14 cmt. c (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ) or prima facie negligence (see, e.g.,
Transportation Dept. v. Christensen, 581 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Mich. App. 1998).  Regardless of the
precise procedural effect of establishing an unexcused violation, in these states the determination
that the enactment is controlling answers in the affirmative the question of whether there is a
legal duty running from the defendant to the plaintiff.  The jury is not free to ignore that
determination.  See Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920) (stating that “[j]urors have
no dispensing power”).
56 See generally RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing relevant considerations).  
57 See RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 cmt. d
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (noting that “in most highway-accident cases, findings of
negligence depend on ascertaining which party has violated the relevant provisions of the state’s
motor-vehicle code”). 
58 See Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920)  (discussing negligence
predicated on failure to stay to the right of the center of the highway, as required by statute).
59 See id. at 815 (holding that the failure of a wagon driver to display the lights required
by a highway law was negligence).
60 See Griffith v. Schmidt, 715 P.2d 905, 911 (Idaho 1985) (holding that exceeding the
speed limit was negligence per se).
61 RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 cmt. e
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
the provisions of the act, or the standards adopted pursuant to the act, might serve as the
predicate for a tort action on what is sometimes called a “negligence per se” theory.55 
Under negligence per se, a court may, in its discretion, embrace a statute that does not
expressly provide for a civil cause of action as the standard of care for a tort suit.  If the
enactment was intended to protect the class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member from
the type of harm that occurred, a court may determine that violation of the statute defines the
appropriate terms for imposing civil liability.56 For example, courts have frequently adopted
traffic rules57–requiring drivers to travel in the proper lane,58 use headlights after dark,59 or not
exceed the speed limit60–as setting the standard of care in auto accident cases because those laws
were intended to protect others on the road from the risk of physical harm.  Referring to such
legislative enactments in tort litigation serves the “function of simplifying or providing structure
to the rendering of negligence determinations.”61 It also helps to ensure consistency in the
resolution of issues of recurring importance and provides clear notice to others as to what should
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62 RESTATEMENT, SECOND, OF TORTS § 286 cmt. d (1965) (discussing obsolescence). 
63 See, e.g., Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. 1998) (holding that a statute imposing a
reporting requirement on any person having “cause to believe” that a child was being abused was
not an appropriate standard for negligence per se liability because, among other things, the
statutory standard was not clearly defined).
64 See generally RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14
cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing statutes duplicating the common law).
65 See id. at § 14 cmt. c (stating that if a statute includes a provision making the statute
irrelevant in a common-law action for damages, courts should honor it).  See also Pool v. Ford
Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986) (holding that the lower court erred in relying on two
statutes, one of which provided that the presumption of intoxication would not apply in civil
actions, and another which stated that “maximum or minimum speed limitations shall not be
construed to relieve the plaintiff in any action from the burden of proving negligence”).
66 See CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 46 n.29  that “[i]t
could be argued that financial institutions have an existing duty under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
implementing regulations to provide immediate and effective incident response to protect the
confidentiality of consumer data maintained on their own networks”).
67 Cf. County of Dallas v. Poston, 104 S.W.3d 719 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding that,
because the statutory duty of a motor vehicle operator crossing a highway to yield the right-of-
way to an approaching vehicle is not absolute, the statute was not a proper basis for a finding of
contributory negligence as a matter of law; the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonably
prudent driver under the same or similar circumstances would have yielded the right-of-way).
68 See Zeni v. Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Mich. 1976) (discussing a sidewalk
statute).
be done in given circumstances.
However, factors other than class of persons and type of harm may be taken into account
in determining whether a statute that is silent as to civil liability appropriately defines what is
expected of a reasonably prudent person.  For example, a court should not embrace as the basis
for civil liability a statute that is obsolete,62 vague,63 or duplicative of existing common-law
obligations.64 Similarly, if the legislature intended the penalties for violation of a law to be
minimal or limited to those set forth in the enactment, a court should not rely on the law as a
basis for imposing other legal obligations.65
The GLBA is an important expression of public policy that courts should take into
account in determining whether database possessors, or some subset thereof (e.g., financial
institutions or businesses generally), have a legal duty enforceable in a tort action to protect
information relating to data subjects.66 Indeed, as an enactment of Congress, the nation’s highest
legislative body, the language of the GLBA is entitled to great weight in resolution of the duty
question.  However, the GLBA itself should not be interpreted as setting the standard of care for
a civil cause of action because it lacks specificity as to precisely what is required of a reasonable
financial institution.67 In contrast to a law that gives clear notice of what is expected–such as a
statute that requires a pedestrian to walk on the sidewalk, not in the street,68 or to “yield the right
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69 Ranard v. O’Neil, 531 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Mont. 1975).
70 RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 cmt. i
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
71 Cf. RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 cmt. e
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005):
Many statutes impose obligations on actors that largely correspond to or codify
obligations imposed by negligence law . . . .  Thus a statute might require motorists to
drive their vehicles at a “reasonable and prudent” speed, or might prohibit driving the
vehicle “carelessly.”  To find that an actor has violated such a statute, the jury would also
need to find that the actor has behaved negligently.  In such situations, the doctrine of
negligence per se is largely superfluous in ascertaining the actor’s liability. . . . [C]ourts
sometimes allow parties to argue negligence per se as a supplement to ordinary
negligence; but more frequently they reject negligence per se, recognizing its
redundancy. . . .
See also Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Knighten, 976 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1998) (holding that a
statute governing the duty of a driver following another vehicle, which required the driver to
proceed safely and safely bring a vehicle to a stop, imposed on the driver a duty of reasonable
care, and precluded the leading driver from obtaining a negligence per se instruction in an action
arising out of a rear-end collision).
72 See Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. § 314.1 et seq.
(Westlaw current through July 1, 2005).    See also CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE,
supra note 12, at 57-58 (stating that “On May 17, 2002, the FTC issued the Safeguards Rule,
which implements the safeguard provisions required by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.  The
Safeguards Rule requires covered entities to implement a comprehensive information security
program by May 23, 2003, to ensure the security, confidentiality, and integrity of nonpublic
customer information against both internal and external threats.  Institutions that fail to comply
could face potential FTC enforcement actions and potential liability under state consumer
protection laws or common law claims (such as negligence)”).
of way to all vehicles upon the roadway”69–the GLBA offers no clear guidance as to exactly
what a financial institution must do to avoid liability.  The act is vague.  It speaks of an
obligation to protect data security without indicating what must be done to fulfil that obligation. 
The vagueness of the GLBA, coupled with its failure to provide for civil liability, means that the
questions of whether there is a tort duty, and if so what that duty requires, are still issues that
must be resolved by the courts.  Of course, “the presence of a statutory requirement that is
binding on the defendant, and the court’s awareness of the legislature’s assumptions in imposing
that requirement, can be important points for the court to consider in determining whether a duty
exists.”70 But the question of duty requires judicial determination.  Consequently, insofar as the
GLBA is concerned, it is not useful to speak of negligence per se.71
The same analysis would not necessarily apply to the regulations adopted pursuant to the
mandates of the GLBA.  Unlike the statute itself, the provisions adopted to implement its
mandates might be sufficiently specific to define what action is required of financial institutions
with regard to protecting data security.  However, the standards that have been adopted, such as
those issued by the Federal Trade Commission,72 are typically flexible in nature, equivocal as to
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73 See 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(a) (stating that financial institutions “shall develop, implement,
and maintain a comprehensive information security program that is written . . . and contains
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards that are appropriate to your size and
complexity, the nature and scope of your activities, and the sensitivity of any customer
information at issue”).
74 See 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(b) (stating that “[a]t a minimum, . . . a risk assessment should
include consideration of risks in each relevant area of your operations, including:  (1) Employee
training and management; (2) Information systems, including network and software design, as
well as information processing, storage, transmission and disposal; and (3) Detecting, preventing
and responding to attacks, intrusions, or other systems failures”).
75 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(c).
76 See 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(e) (requiring adjustments in light of “any material changes to
your operations or business arrangements; or any other circumstances that you know or have
reason to know may have a material impact on your information security program”). 
77 See 12 CFR Pt. 30, App. B (Westlaw current through July 1, 2005).  One provision in
the Interagency Guidelines that has some degree of specificity concerns service providers.  The
Guidelines state that “[e]ach bank shall . . . [r]equire its service providers by contract to
implement appropriate measures designed to meet the objectives of these Guidelines.”  Id.
However, it is doubtful whether this rule would be a helpful standard for resolving tort litigation
by customers.  The plaintiff would have to show that not only did the service provider not
employ appropriate safeguards, but that except for the absence of a contractual provision that
would not have occurred.  Such a finding would entail a degree of speculation by the fact finder,
and might present the type of causation problem that is sufficient to dissuade a court from
embracing a rule as establishing the threshold for liability.  See Stachniewicz v. Mar-Cam Corp.,
488 P.2d 436 (Or. 1971) (declining to hold that a dram shop statute set the standard of care
because it would complicate the causation assessment).
78 The GLBA also extensively regulates the sharing of personal data between
institutions.  A violation of those provisions does not give an affected individual a private cause
of action.  See Menton v. Experian Corp., 2003 W.L. 21692820, *3 (S.D.N.Y.) (finding. in dicta, 
no private right of action).
79 See generally Preston & Turner, supra note page 7, at 471-77 (discussing data security
provisions in the Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and
what must be done, and generally unsuited to defining the conduct expected of a reasonably
prudent financial institution.  The FTC standards require financial institutions subject to the
commission’s jurisdiction to develop and implement a written security plan “appropriate”73 to
their size and complexity, which takes into account various sources of risk,74 regularly tests the
effectiveness of its “safeguards’ key controls, systems, and procedures,”75 and is periodically
adjusted as necessary.76 Thus, the standards simply endorse a process by which financial
institutions are required to address security issues.  Like the GLBA itself, the FTC standards
offer no clear guidance as to precisely what precautions must be implemented to protect data
security.  The same is true of the federal Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for
Safeguarding Customer Information, which address the obligations imposed by the GLBA.77 As
yet, no reported cases have held that the data security provisions78 of the GLBA, related
regulations, or other federal laws79 set the standard of care for a tort action by a customer against
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Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)).
80 See R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 11-49.2-2(2) et seq., R.I. Legis. 05-225 (providing that “A
business that owns or licenses computerized unencripted personal information about a Rhode
Island resident shall implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices
appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect the personal information from
unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure”).  Each violation of the Rhode
Island law “is a civil violation for which a penalty of not more than a hundred dollars ($100) per
occurrence and not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) may be adjudged against a
defendant”).  Id. at § 11-49.2-6(a).
81 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-104(b), Ar. Legis. 1526 (2005) (requiring a “person or
business that acquires, owns, or licenses personal information about an Arkansas resident . . .
[to] implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the
nature of the information to protect the personal information from unauthorized access,
destruction, use, modification, or disclosure”).
82 Id. at § 4-110-108.
83 Id. at § 4-110-106(b) (italics added). 
84 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 48.001 et seq., Tx. Legis. 294 (2005).
85 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b) (Westlaw current through Ch. 33 of 2005 Reg. Sess.
urgency legis. & Gov. Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 2005).
86 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 48.102(a) (providing that “[a] business shall implement
and maintain reasonable procedures, including taking appropriate corrective action, to protect
and safeguard from unlawful use or disclosure any sensitive personal information collected or
maintained by the business . . .”).
87 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84.
a financial institution.
 
2.  State Security Breach Notification Laws
Certain state security breach notification laws that require database possessors to protect
personal information from unauthorized access make no provision for civil liability.80 Some of
these laws may nevertheless leave room for judicial recognition of a civil cause of action.  For
example, the Arkansas Personal Information Protection Act,81 which provides only for
enforcement by the attorney general,82 states that the act “does not relieve a person or business
from a duty to comply with any other requirements of other state and federal law regarding the
protection and privacy of personal information.”83 However, the use of the word “other” seems
to suggest that the security breach notification law should not, by itself, be embraced by a court
as the basis for a civil cause of action.
Similarly, it is difficult to envision that the Texas state security breach statute could be
used as a predicate for a negligence per se claim.  The Texas law,84 like its California
predecessor, 85 obliges a database possessor to exercise care to protect the personal information
of data subjects.86 However, unlike the California SBIA,87 the Texas act does not create a civil
cause of action against a database possessor who fails to exercise reasonable care.  Indeed, while
the Texas act is silent on that subject, it expressly provides for a deceptive trade practices
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88 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 48.203.
89 See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 48.101 (providing that “[a] person may not obtain,
possess, transfer, or use personal identifying information of another person without the other
person’s consent and with intent to obtain a good, a service, insurance, an extension of credit, or
any other thing of value in the other person’s name”).
90 To “express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the
alternative.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
91 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 33, at 9 (noting that it is a policy foundation of
American tort law that “[c]ourts should accord due deference to co-equal branches of
government”; “there are occasions when the judiciary should eschew action in favor of other
branches. . . .  [C]ertain questions are best left to the legislature because of its ability to gather
facts through the legislative hearing process, to craft comprehensive solutions to broad-ranging
questions, or to represent the will of the public on highly controversial issues”).
92 Cf. Bruegger v. Faribault County Sheriff’s Dept., 497 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. 1993)
(holding that a violation of the Crime Victims Reparations Act (CVRA) did not create a private
cause of action against law enforcement agencies which failed to inform the plaintiffs of their
rights to seek reparations; “[p]rinciples of judicial restraint preclude us from creating a new
statutory cause of action that does not exist at common law where the legislature has not either
by the statute’s express terms or by implication provided for civil tort liability”).
93 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
94 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
95 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES,
JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 111 (1976).
action88 against hackers and others who obtain, possess, transfer, or use the personal information
of another without authorization.89 It would be reasonable to interpret the Texas statute as an
expression that civil liability should extend thus far (to hackers and other unauthorized persons)
and no further (to database possessors).  Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.90 That
construction of the law could be supported on public policy grounds, namely that judicial
deference to a co-equal branch of government91 means that a court should not create a cause of
action where the legislature has implicitly determined that none should exist.92
C.  Basic Tort Principles
1.  Palsgraf, Kline, and Related Cases
Turning to the issue of whether common-law principles–as opposed to statutes–support
judicial recognition of a duty on the part of database possessors to safeguard information from
intruders, it is useful to consider the guidance offered by two landmark cases:  Palsgraf v. Long
Island Railroad Co.93 and Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corporation.94 Each
of these decisions has appeared in countless tort casebooks and has been cited scores of times by
judicial decisions.  Palsgraf and Kline are important pillars in the temple of American tort law.
In Palsgraf, the most famous tort case of all time, the majority opinion was written by
Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo, the “most justly celebrated of American common-law judges.”95 
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96 162 N.E. at 100.
97 162 N.E. at 99.
98 See, e.g., Holder v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 5 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. 1999) (deciding, with
reliance on Palsgraf, that the owner of a parking garage was not responsible for an attack on the
third-person perpetrated there by a stranger in the middle of the night because there was no
reason to foresee that the attacker or victim would be present at that hour).
99 162 N.E. at 100.
100 Id. at 100.
101 439 F.2d at 488 (stating that  a landlord’s “duty is to take those measures of
protection which are within his power and capacity to take, and which can reasonably be
expected to mitigate the risk of intruders assaulting and robbing tenants”). 
Cardozo set down the basic rule on duty for the New York Court of Appeals.  “The risk
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed and risk imports relation; it is risk to
another or to others within the range of apprehension.”96 In Palsgraf, there was nothing in the
appearance of a newspaper-wrapped package being carried by a man trying to board a moving
train that gave notice that the parcel contained explosives.  Therefore, there was nothing to warn
the trainmen that, if the package was dropped, Helen Palsgraf, a patron waiting across the
platform, was in danger.  There was no “risk [to her] reasonably to be perceived,” and thus no
“duty [to her] to be obeyed.”  So far as she was concerned, the railroad was under no legal
obligation not to carelessly dislodge the package while trying to assist the man who was running
for the train, but “seemed unsteady as if about to fall.”97 Because there was no duty to Palsgraf,
the railroad was not liable in negligence for the harm she sustained when the package fell and
exploded.
Courts today continue to apply the Palsgraf duty rule.98 Thus, it is useful to ask whether,
from the standpoint of database possessors, there is a “risk reasonably to be perceived”99 to data
subjects if data is not protected from unauthorized intrusion.  Obviously, in many situations
(such as where data is accessible to hackers via the Internet), the answer is “yes.”  The risk is
entirely foreseeable and a threat to the interests of data subjects is “within the range of
apprehension.”100 At least on its face, the basic rule in Palsgraf suggests that database
possessors should often have a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect data from intruders.”
Palsgraf did not involve the threat of criminal intervention, but Kline did.  In Kline, a
landlord was on notice that an increasing number of assaults, larcenies, and robberies were being
perpetrated on tenants in the common areas of a large apartment building.  In holding the
landlord responsible for a subsequent attack on the plaintiff, the court said that a landlord is by
no means an insurer of the safety of its tenants and is not obliged to provide protection
commonly afforded by a police department.  However, a landlord is under a duty to take such
precautions as are within its power and capacity to prevent harm by criminal intruders.101 In
writing for the D.C. Circuit, Judge Malcolm Richard Wilkey emphasized the fact that the
landlord was the only party in a position to secure the common areas:
No individual tenant had it within his power to take measures to guard the garage
entranceways, to provide scrutiny at the main entrance of the building, to patrol the
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it difficult, if not impossible, for an individual to control access to his personal information and,
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105 See generally Brendan Delaney, Comment, Identity Theft:  The Fair Credit Reporting
Act and Negligent Enablement of Imposter Fraud, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2005) (arguing
for “greater federal protection for potential victims of identity theft and for common law judicial
recognition of the tort of negligent enablement of impostor fraud”).
106 585 S.E.2d 275 (S.C. 2003).
common hallways and elevators, to set up any kind of a security alarm system in the
building, to provide additional locking devices on the main doors, to provide a system of
announcement for authorized visitors only, to close the garage doors at appropriate hours,
and to see that the entrance was manned at all times.102
The court added:
The landlord is entirely justified in passing on the cost of increased protective
measures to his tenants, but the rationale of compelling the landlord to do it in the first
place is that he is the only one who is in a position to take the necessary protective
measures for overall protection of the premises . . . .103
A similar analysis is equally applicable to cases involving database security.  Individual
data subjects are in a poor position to do anything to protect database information about them
from intruders.104 The database possessor, in contrast, is the only one with the ability to mitigate
the risk that intruders may cause harm.  As in Kline, the cost of providing database security
could be spread to a broader class of data subjects, at least in cases where there is a customer
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant.  Kline, like Palsgraf, suggests that, at least in
some circumstances, database possessors should owe data subjects a duty to exercise reasonable
care to protect data from intruders.
In both Palsgraf and Kline, there was a relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant.  Palsgraf was a ticket purchaser of the defendant railroad; Kline was a tenant of the
defendant corporation.  Those relational ties are important, for other cases teach that duty often
depends upon more than foreseeability of harm and opportunity to take precautions–it depends,
sometimes, on a special linkage between the party on whom the duty would be imposed and the
one who would be benefited.  In this regard, the recent cases involving allegedly negligent
enablement of imposter fraud105 are instructive.
In Huggins v. Citibank, N.A.,106 for example, the plaintiff sued various banks on the
ground that they negligently issued credit cards in the plaintiff’s name to an unknown imposter. 
The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the banks issued “credit cards without any
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110 See, e.g., Smith v. Citibank, 2001 WL 34079057 (W.D. Mo. 2001) (holding that a
credit card issuer is not liable in negligence to a non-customer); Polzer v. TRW, Inc., 682
N.Y.S.2d 194 (App. Div. 1998) (similar).
111 Sometimes a business relationship is proposed but not consummated, such as where
an applicant applies to a university, but is not accepted for admission.  The business (university)
benefits from solicitation and review of applications, so it may be fair to impose on the
institution an obligation to safeguard the data of the applicant so long as that data is retained. 
The same would seem to be true where the relationship has effectively ended, as in the case
where a student has graduated.   Cf. Stacy Finz, Hackers Hit College Computer System, San
Fran. Chron., Aug. 9, 2005 (discussing hackers who gained access to the records of 61,709
persons “who either attended, applied, graduated or worked” at Sonoma State University).   
112 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 33, at 7-8 (stating that “[i]t has often been urged
that . . . [t]hose who benefit from dangerous activities should bear resulting losses.  Certain
activities–e.g., owning a dog that may bite or using explosives–entail a serious risk of harm to
third persons even if care is exercised by the actor.  According to this principle, fairness requires
that those who enjoy the benefits of such conduct should bear resulting losses . . . .  In a related
vein, it is sometimes said that an activity ‘must pay its own way.’ What this means is that there is
good reason for the law to force the promoters of activities to ‘internalize’ the costs that their
endeavors inflict on third persons.  Only when those costs are taken into account, it is argued, are
promoters likely to make decisions that are not only personally beneficial, but socially
investigation, verification, or corroboration” of the applicant’s identity.107 In response, the banks
asserted they owed no duty to the plaintiff because he was not their customer.108 The court
agreed with the defendants and wrote:
In order for negligence liability to attach, the parties must have a relationship recognized
by law as the foundation of a duty of care. . . .  In the absence of a duty to prevent an
injury, foreseeability of that injury is an insufficient basis on which to rest liability. . . .
. . . .
The relationship, if any, between credit card issuers and potential victims of
identity theft is far too attenuated to rise to the level of a duty between them. . . .109
Other courts have reached similar conclusions.110
Together, Palsgraf, Kline, and Huggins indicate that the strongest cases for imposing a
common-law duty to guard data from intruders will be those where there is a business
relationship111 between defendant database possessor and the plaintiff data subject.  This makes
sense on economic, as well as doctrinal, grounds.  Imposing a duty of care in such cases will
force the database possessor, who benefits from the use of computerized information, to
internalize losses relating to improperly accessed data as a cost of doing business.112 That, in
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responsible”).
113 But see JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 33, at 743 (discussing the limits of risk
spreading).
114 Cf. Rustad, supra note 2, 6, at 108 (stating that “[i]t is unclear . . . whether a website
owes a general duty of care to website visitors when there is no statutorily mandated standard of
care”).
115 See Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (Cal. 1968) (indicating that among
the policy considerations typically deemed relevant to whether a duty to act should be imposed
are “the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm,
the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty
to exercise care with resulting liability for breach”).
116 Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (Cal. 1968). 
117 See CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 45 (opining that “[i]f
tort law is found to apply to computer security, then the potential for civil liability lawsuits (with
the likelihood of monetary damages) could encourage companies to invest in computer security
measures”).
118 See Wibel, supra note 12, at 1578 (stating that “[e]ven a nonmalicious trespass
disrupts the victim’s online services while the breach is fixed. . . .  [C]ompanies generally
expend resources investigating the matter, often hiring private investigators so that they do not
turn, will create an incentive for database possessors to scrutinize whether their business
methods are really worth the costs they entail.  At the same time, the imposition of a duty in a
business context gives the database possessor a means for distributing the loss through price
adjustments of goods or services sold to the class of persons which ultimately benefits from the
defendant’s business methods.  That reallocation of losses will help to ensure that the costs
relating to improperly accessed data will not fall with crushing weight on either the data subject
or the database possessor.113
2.  Public Policy Analysis
In addressing questions of duty in areas of the law that are not well settled,114 courts often
ask whether imposition of duty makes sense as a matter of public policy.  They consider, for
example, whether obligating the defendant to exercise care would tend to minimize harm to
potential plaintiffs without being unduly burdensome to the defendant or disruptive to the
community.115 Courts also sometimes consider “the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved,”116 with the assumption being that insurability of the risk makes
imposition of a duty more palatable because the costs of the harm can be spread broadly.  On
each of these grounds–deterrence of losses, burden to the defendant, community consequences,
and insurance–a good argument can be made for requiring database possessors to exercise care
to prevent harm by intruders.
Placing a burden on database possessors to protect data from unauthorized access would
tend to reduce intruder-related losses by encouraging investment in database security.117 That
investment would be consistent with the possessors’ own interests because unauthorized access
entails huge costs for those who maintain databases.118 Companies must spend large sums of
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suffer reputational loss”).
119 See Rustad, supra note 2, 6, at (stating that in 2000, “private companies spent an
estimated $300 billion in private enforcement efforts against hackers and viruses”).
120 See Wibel, supra note 12, at 1597-98 (reporting that “[c]omputer crime cost about
$250 million in 1998 and jumped to more than $375 million in 2001. . . .  In 2000, private
companies spent an estimated $300 billion in private enforcement efforts against hackers and
viruses”).
121 See Steinberg, supra note 22, at 60.
122 Presumably, judicial willingness to recognize a common-law duty to protect
databases is increased by the existence of state security breach notification laws.  Cf. Paetkau &
Torabian-Bashardoust, supra note 39, at 39 (discussing the California law’s obligation to
disclose security breaches and opining that “from a legal perspective, if the company notifies
only California residents of a security breach, potentially affected non-Californian residents
could persuasively argue that the company was at least negligent in not notifying them of the
breach”).
123 See Part II-B-1 (discussing the regulations adopted pursuant to the GLBA).
124 See Erin E. Kenneally, Stepping on the Digital Scale:  Duty and Liability for
Negligent Internet Security, 1 Ann. 2002 ATLA-CLE 403 (2002) (discussing the liability of
companies doing business on the web).
125 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 33, at 7 (noting that in the development of
American tort law it has often been urged that “[t]he costs of accidents should be spread broadly. 
The idea underlying the ‘spreading’ rationale is that the financial burden of accidents may be
diminished by spreading losses broadly so that no person is forced to bear a large share of the
damages. . . . Losses can be spread not only through increases in the costs of goods and services,
but through other devices such as taxation and insurance”).
126 See Steinberg, supra note 22, at 60 (stating that “[s]tand-alone network-risk, hacker,
or cyber insurance is now being offered . . . .  [T]hese policies offer protection against intangible
data loss from viruses, denial-of-service attacks, and theft of consumer information–and the
money to protect their websites119 and other data sources, as well as to cover resulting harm
when protection efforts are unsuccessful.120 “The financial losses facing corporate America as a
result of network security breaches are staggering–hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars
each year . . . .”121 The burden entailed by the imposition of a legal duty would by no means be
solely for the benefit of potential plaintiffs.
The imposition of a common-law tort duty to protect databases would also be consistent
with the developing fabric of the law.  As the preceding discussion suggests, an increasing
number of statutes122 and regulations,123 as well as commentators,124 say that reasonable care
must be exercised to protect computerized personal data from unauthorized access.  Thus,
recognition of a tort duty to protect data would not be disruptive to the community.  It would not
require new institutions or controversial practices.  Indeed, a common-law tort duty to protect
data would be complementary of recent developments in both the law and business. 
The liability risks arising from data intrusion can be spread125 by insurance, and policies
are now being offered.126 Of equal importance, insurers can and do provide guidance to their
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protection can extend to third-party liabilities.  Insurance premiums remain considerable, and
prequalifying security assessments can be demanding; moreover, legal advice is often a
pre-requisite for navigating the various gaps and exclusions written into such policies”).
127 See Jay P. Kesan, Ruperto P. Majuca, & William J. Yurcik, The Economic Case for
Cyberinsurance, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE __ (Stanford Univ. Press 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=577862 (last visited Aug. 10, 2005) (stating that
“cyberinsurance facilitates standards for best practices as cyberinsurers seek benchmark security
levels for risk-management decisionmaking”); CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra
note  12, at 65-66 (discussing how the insurance industry can motivate responsible practices in
the private sector).  
128 See CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 51 (discussing the
problem).
129 See Thomas J. Smedinghoff, The Developing U.S. Legal Standard for Cybersecurity 
The Sedona Conference Journal, June, 2003, available at
http://www.bakernet.com/ecommerce/us cybersecurity standards.pdf) (last visited Aug. 9, 2005)
(discussing “laws and regulations requiring security” and “the developing trend as to what
businesses must do to satisfy their legal obligations to provide appropriate security”).
130 See CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 50 (stating that “[a]s
a motivating factor for industry to adopt best practices, tort law can be a significant complement
to standard-setting, because compliance with industry-wide standards is usually an acceptable
demonstration of due care”); Randy V. Sabett, Graceful Disclosure: The Pros & Cons of
Mandatory Reporting of Security Vulnerabilities, 4 SEDONA CONF. J. 121, 124 (2003) (stating
that “several organizations have developed vulnerability disclosure policies” relating to
software).
insureds about practices calculated to minimize liability.127 That advice helps to reduce the
frequency and amount of future losses, and thereby reinforces the deterrence objectives of the
law. 
Imposing a tort duty under which database possessors will be held liable for negligent
data security practices will inevitably leave many questions unanswered.  To say that an
enterprise has a duty to exercise reasonable care to ensure data security provides no clear
guidance as to very practical questions, such as how often patches should be applied to security
software.128 But these types of questions are no different than those faced in a thousand other
settings where courts apply the rules of negligence liability.  Over the long run, the burden of
uncertainty is minimized by evolving guidance found in scholarship discussing court decisions
and legislation,129 as well as by the development of industry customs130 and the promulgation of
regulations which help to define what conduct is required of a potential defendant seeking to
avoid liability.
3.  Voluntary Assumption of Duty
Even if courts decline to impose a tort duty to safeguard data on database possessors
generally (or at least on businesses), a legally enforceable data-protection obligation may be
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131 See generally RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 42
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132 See id. at § 42 cmt. e (discussing promises as undertakings).
133 See id. at § 42(a) (providing that “[a]n actor who undertakes to render services to
another that the actor knows or should know reduce the risk of physical harm to the other has a
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such care increases the risk of harm beyond that which existed without the undertaking”).
134 See generally Therese G. Franzén & Leslie Howell, Financial Privacy Rules: A Step
By Step Guide to the New Disclosure Requirements Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the
Implementing Regulations, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 17, 20-21 (2001) (discussing privacy
notices).
135 Bank of America Privacy Policy for Customers 2005, at
http://www.bankofamerica.com/privacy/index.cfm?template=privacysecur_cnsmr .
recognized under voluntary-assumption-of-duty principles.131 A person who is not otherwise
under a duty to exercise reasonable care may voluntarily assume the responsibility to do so.  One
way of doing that is by promising to exercise care and thereby inducing detrimental reliance.132 
Another way is by entering upon an “undertaking” and consequently increasing the risk of harm
to the plaintiff.133 Either way, if the voluntarily assumed duty is breached and causes damage,
the party who undertook the duty of reasonable care will be subject to liability.
These well-established principles might be found to apply to situations where consumers
reveal personal information to financial institutions in reliance upon their stated privacy
policies.134 For example, the policy of one major banking institution, which is not atypical, states
in reassuring terms:
The law gives you certain privacy rights.  Bank of America gives you more. . . . 
. . . .
Keeping financial information secure is one of our most important responsibilities.  We
maintain physical, electronic and procedural safeguards to protect Customer Information.
. . . .
. . . . All companies that act on our behalf are contractually obligated to keep the
information we provide to them confidential . . . .135
A customer reading this information would conclude, at a minimum, that in exchange for
being entrusted with personal information, the bank had agreed (1) to protect the data by means
of physical, electronic, and procedural safeguards and (2) keep it confidential.  Those very
sensible conclusions would be reinforced by other language in the privacy policy stressing the
importance of precautions on the part of the customer to guard against disclosure or
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139 See RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 42(a)
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005) (discussing increased risk of harm).
140 See PulseCard, Inc. v. Discover Card Services, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1478, 1484 (D.
Kan.1996) (stating that “[t]he hallmark of a fiduciary relationship is a voluntary and conscious
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141 See RESTATEMENT, SECOND, OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1979) (stating that “[a] fiduciary
relation exists between two persons when one of them is under a duty to act for or to give advice
for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation”).
unauthorized use of account and personal information.136 The same is true of statements in the
bank’s advertising137 or on its website emphasizing the dangers of identity theft and assuring the
customer that “[y]our statements are always protected in Online Banking. . . .”138 A court might
reasonably interpret such a privacy policy as an undertaking to exercise reasonable care, and
might conclude that a breach of that duty would support a tort cause of action.
Similarly, even if the plaintiff never read or relied on the institution’s privacy policy, a
duty of care might be imposed under the other prong of the undertaking rule which says that,
where services provided for the protection of another increase the risk of harm beyond that
which existed without the undertaking, there is a duty to exercise reasonable care.139 Depending
on the facts, the measures (e.g., use of passwords, firewalls, etc.) taken to protect computerized
data may contain flaws which increase the risk of unauthorized data access.  An increased risk of
harm might also result where data protection practices allow transmission of unencrypted data,
which is especially vulnerable to hacking.  To these types of cases, the increased-risk rule might
apply.
According to the Restatement provision on undertakings, negligence liability that is
based on inducing detrimental reliance or increasing the risk of injury is limited to compensation
for physical harm.  This is a significant limitation which presumably means that the economic
losses associated with identity theft are not recoverable under this theory of duty.  However, a
database possessor might still be liable under the undertaking rule for personal injury or property
damage perpetrated on a data subject by an intruder or one who obtained personal information
from that person.
D.  Fiduciary Obligations
A fiduciary is one who voluntarily140 holds a position of special trust and confidence
which obliges the fiduciary to act in the best interest of another.141 The duties imposed on a
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one”). 
146 See RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 (2000)
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147 See N.Y. State Bar Assn. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Opinion No. 782 (2004) (stating
that “[w]hen a lawyer sends a document by e-mail, as with any other type of communication, a
lawyer must exercise reasonable care to ensure that he or she does not inadvertently disclose his
or her client’s confidential information. . . .  Reasonable care may, in some circumstances, call
for the lawyer to stay abreast of technological advances and the potential risks in transmission in
order to make an appropriate decision with respect to the mode of transmission”).  See generally
Jonathan Bick, Client Internet Services Expose Firms to New Liability, N.J. L.J., Sept. 20, 2004,
available at http://www.bicklaw.com/Publications/Client_internet_to_Liability.htm (last visited
Aug. 9, 2005) ( indicating that client services now include “offering clients protected access to
their personal case information over the Internet” and stating that “ethical rules . . . [are] equally
applicable to Internet transactions”); David Hricik, The Speed of Normal:  Conflicts,
Competency, and Confidentiality in the Digital Age, 9 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. ____, ____
(2005) (discussing ethical obligations of attorneys relating to digitally stored client confidences).
fiduciary–including loyalty, candor, and confidentiality–are sometimes co-extensive with those
embraced by the law of negligence.142 However, depending on the circumstances, fiduciary
obligations may extend considerably further than a duty of reasonable care.143
If a database possessor owes fiduciary obligations to a data subject, it may reasonably be
argued that regardless of whether general tort principles would impose such a duty, the fiduciary
is obliged to protect computerized information relating to the data subject from unauthorized
access by third parties.144 For example, the relationship between an attorney and client is
fiduciary as a matter of law.145 Accordingly, lawyers have a special fiduciary obligation to
protect confidential client information, aside from any demands imposed by ordinary tort
principles.  A lawyer’s broad fiduciary obligation of confidentiality extends to all forms of
information about the client.146 This includes computerized data,147 as well as information
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153 See Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 429 (2d
Cir. 1999) (finding that “irrespective of the duties of the Diocese to its parishioners generally,
the jury could reasonably have found that the Diocese’s relationship with [the plaintiff] was of a
fiduciary nature”); Curl v. Key, 316 S.E.2d 272 (N.C. 1984) (holding that a confidential
relationship existed and that the deed could be set aside on grounds of fraud where the
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Corp. v. Crim Truck & Tractor Co., 791 S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1990) 
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154 See, e.g., PulseCard, Inc. v. Discover Card Services, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1478, 1484
(D. Kan. 1996) (stating that “fiduciary obligations should be extended reluctantly to commercial
contained in printed documents or otherwise known by the attorney,148 for the existence of the
duty turns on the content, not the form, of the information.149 In light of the fiduciary-duty rules
on confidentiality (and the related obligations requiring safekeeping of client property150), a
lawyer or law firm could not plausibly argue that there is no duty to safeguard computerized
client data from intruders.
The same analysis should apply to all fiduciary relationships,151 including those which are
fiduciary as a matter of law (such as trustee-beneficiary152) and others which are fiduciary as a
matter of fact because they entail a high degree of trust and confidence.153 Importantly, however,
ordinary business relationships are not fiduciary.154 In business, parties normally deal with one
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another at “arms length.”155 The “mere acceptance of confidential information” does not create a
fiduciary relationship,156 nor does the fact that one party “trusts another and relies on a promise
to carry out a contract.”157 Fiduciary relationships are the exception, not the rule.  Even the
relationship between a teacher and a student158 or a university and its alumni159 is usually not
fiduciary in nature.  Consequently, while fiduciary-duty law may play an important role in
whether professionals, such as lawyers, physicians, or trustees, have a duty to protect from
intruders the information of clients, patients, and beneficiaries, it will not set the standard of care
in most commercial settings.
III. The Duty to Reveal Evidence of Security Breaches
It is important to distinguish the duty to protect data from intrusion from the duty to
disclose information that data security has been breached.  A statute might impose both
obligations (as does California’s SBIA160), or it might impose one duty but not the other.  For
example, the Louisiana Database Security Breach Notification Law161 contains no explicit
obligation to protect data, but requires notification of data subjects upon discovery that security
has been breached.162 In addition, as discussed below, common-law rules may distinguish the
obligation to disclose from the obligation to protect.  For example, under certain rules, one
whose conduct, “even though not tortious,” has created a continuing risk of physical harm to the
plaintiff has an obligation to exercise care to prevent the harm from occurring or minimize the
adverse consequences.163 This may mean that even if a database possessor was not under a duty
enforceable in a private civil action to protect a data subject’s personal information from
unauthorized access, a duty may arise as a result of the intrusion and the possessor may have an
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164 See Part III-B-3, infra.
165 See Part III-A, infra.
166 See Part III-B-1, infra.
167 See Part III-B-2, infra.
168 See Part III-B-3, infra.
169 See note 25, supra.
170 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-3-115(5)(1)(a) and (7), Mt. Legis. 518 (2005)
(imposing a notification obligation on “[a]ny person or business that conducts business” and
defining a business as “a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, association, or other
group, however organized and whether or not organized to operate at a profit, including a
financial institution . . . or the parent or the subsidiary of a financial institution”);  N.D. CENT.
CODE § 51-30-02, N.D. Legis. 447 (2005) (applying to “[a]ny person that conducts business”). 
But see GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-911(2) and § 10-1-912(a), Ga. Legis. 163 (2005) (limiting the
obligation to “information brokers,” who are defined as “any person or entity who, for monetary
fees or dues, engages in whole or in part in the business of collecting, assembling, evaluating,
compiling, reporting, transmitting, transferring, or communicating information concerning
individuals for the primary purpose of furnishing personal information to nonaffiliated third
parties,” and not including “any governmental agency whose records are maintained primarily
for traffic safety, law enforcement, or licensing purposes”); ME. REV. STAT. § 1348, Me. Legis.
379 (2005) (limiting the notification duty to information brokers).  Some businesses may be
exempt from state-law obligations imposed on businesses generally.  See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. §
51:3076, La. Legis. 499 (2005) (exempting financial institutions that are subject to certain
federal rules).
171 See IND. CODE §§ 4-1-10-2 & 4-1-11-5, In. Legis. 91-2005 (2005) (limiting the
notification obligation to state agencies, including state educational institutions); 2005 NEV.
LAWS Ch. 486 (A.B. 334), § 4(1), Nv. Legis. 486 (2005) (slip copy) (imposing a duty on
obligation to reveal that the security of the data has been breached.164
A duty to reveal that database security has been compromised may be placed on potential
defendants in at least four ways.  First, the duty may be imposed by statute, either as a result of
the law’s express terms or as a result of judicial reliance on the statute as the proper expression
of the standard of care.165 Second, a duty may arise from common-law principles governing
negligence liability generally.166 Third, a duty might be imposed under the law of
misrepresentation, which creates a duty to update previously accurate statements (e.g., relating to
data security) that are the basis for pending or continuing reliance by the recipient of the
statements.167 Finally, as noted above, failure-to-act rules may require the exercise of reasonable
care to avoid or minimize damages, if a database possessor’s conduct has created a continuing
risk of physical risk harm.168
A.  Statutory Duties
At least eighteen states169 now have adopted database security breach information acts
which require certain types of database possessors (typically businesses,170 but sometimes
governmental agencies171 or other persons or entities,172 such as non-profit organizations173) to
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governmental agencies; separate provisions apply to persons “doing business” (2005 NEV. LAWS
Ch. 486 (A.B. 334), § 6(1)(1), Nv. Legis. 486 (2005) (slip copy)) and “data collectors” (2005
Nevada Laws Ch. 485 (S.B. 347), § 24(1), Nv. Legis. 485 (2005) (slip copy)); R.I. GEN. LAWS. §
11-49.2-3 & 4, R.I. Legis. 05-225 (requiring that notification be provided by “[a]ny state agency
or person that owns, maintains or licenses computerized data”; “person” is defined as “any
individual, partnership association, corporation or joint venture”) ; WASH. REV. CODE §
42.17(a)(1), Wa. Legis. 368 (2005) (imposing a notification on governmental agencies; other
provisions place a similar obligation on “[a]ny person or business that conducts business (WASH.
REV. CODE § 19, Wash. Legis. 368 (2005)).
172 See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 530/5 & 10(a), Il. Legis. 94-36 (2005) (imposing a
notification obligation on a “data collector,” which “may include, but is not limited to,
government agencies, public and private universities, privately and publicly held corporations,
financial institutions, retail operators, and any other entity that, for any purpose, handles,
collects, disseminates, or otherwise deals with nonpublic personal information”); 2005 TENN.
LAWS PUB. CH. 473 §§ 1(a)(2) and 1(b)(S.B. 2220), Tn. Legis. 473 (2005) (imposing a duty on
an “information holder,” which includes “any person or business that conducts business in this
state, or any agency of the State of Tennessee or any of its political subdivisions”).
173 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-101(2) and § 12B-102(a), De. Legis. 61 (2005)
(imposing a notification obligation on a “commercial entity,” “whether for profit or not-for-
profit”).
174 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(1)(a), Fl. Legis. 2005-229 (imposing a
notification obligation if personal information relating to a resident “was, or is reasonably
believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person”); IND. CODE § 4-1-11-5, In. Legis.
91-2005 (2005) (similar).
175 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84 (Westlaw current through Ch. 33 of 2005 Reg. Sess.
urgency legislation & Gov. Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 2005) (stating that “[a] customer injured by a
violation of this title may institute a civil action to recover damages”); LA. REV. STAT. §
51:3075, La. Legis. 499 (2005) (providing that “a civil action may be instituted to recover actual
damages resulting from the failure to disclose in a timely manner to a person that there has been
a breach of the security system resulting in the disclosure of a person’s personal information”);
2005 NEV. LAWS Ch. 486 (A.B. 334), § 5 Slip Copy, Nv. Legis. 486 (2005) (slip copy)
(providing that a “person who has suffered injury as the proximate result of a violation of this
section may commence an action against the governmental agency for the recovery of his actual
damages, costs and reasonable attorney’s fees,” subject to limitations): id. at § 6(7) (indicating
that “[a] person who has suffered injury as the proximate result of a violation . . . may commence
an action against the person doing business in this State for the recovery of his actual damages,
costs and reasonable attorney’s fees and, if the violation of this section was willful or intentional,
for any punitive damages that the facts may warrant”); 2005 Tenn. Laws Pub. Ch. 473 § 1(h)
(S.B. 2220), Tn. Legis. 473 (2005) (providing that “[a]ny customer of an information holder who
is a person or business entity, but who is not an agency of the state or any political subdivision of
the state, and who is injured by a violation of this section may institute a civil action to recover
notify data subjects that the security of their information has been (or may have been) violated.174 
Several of the states imposing notification obligations expressly authorize a civil action for
damages.175 In addition, Illinois allows a deceptive trade practices action,176 which permits a
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damages”); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19(10)(a) & 42.17(10)(a), Wa. Legis. 368 (2005) (providing
that “[a]ny customer injured by a violation of this section may institute a civil action to recover
damages”).
176 See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 530/20, Il. Legis. 94-36 (2005) (providing that “[a]
violation . . . constitutes an unlawful practice under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act”).
177 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10a(a) (Westlaw current through P.A. 94-89 of the 2005
Reg. Sess.).
178 Id. at 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10a(c).
179 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(1)(b), Fl. Legis. 2005-229 (providing that “[a]ny
person required to make notification . . . who fails to do so within 45 days . . . is liable for an
administrative fine not to exceed $500,000, as follows:  1. In the amount of $1,000 for each day
the breach goes undisclosed for up to 30 days and, thereafter, $50,000 for each 30-day period or
portion thereof for up to 180 days.  2. If notification is not made within 180 days, any person
required to make notification under paragraph (a) who fails to do so is subject to an
administrative fine of up to $500,000").   In Florida, “[t]he administrative sanctions for failure to
notify provided in this subsection shall apply per breach and not per individual affected by the
breach.”  Id. at § 817.5681(1)(c).  Administrative sanctions generally do not apply against a
“governmental agency or subdivision.”  Id. at § 817.5681(1)(d).  See also MONT. CODE ANN. §
31-3-115(8)(2) & (3), Mt. Legis. 518 (2005) (treating violations as deceptive trade practices
subject to injunctive relief and civil fines).
180 See R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 11-49.2-6(a) et seq., R.I. Legis. 05-225 (stating that “[e]ach
violation of this chapter is a civil violation for which a penalty of not more than a hundred
dollars ($100) per occurrence and not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) may be
adjudged against a defendant”).
181 See MINN. STAT. § 325E.61(6), Mn. Legis. 167 (2005) (providing for enforcement by
the attorney general). 
182 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-104, De. Legis. 61 (2005) (providing that “the
Attorney General may bring an action in law or equity to . . . ensure proper compliance with this
chapter or to recover direct economic damages resulting from a violation, or both”).
183 See 2005 CONN. LEGIS. SERV. P.A. 05-148 § 3(g) (S.S.B. 650), Ct. Legis. P.A. 05-148
(as apparently the sole remedy, providing that “[f]ailure to comply with the requirements of this
section shall constitute an unfair trade practice . . . and shall be enforced by the Attorney
General”).   See also 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/3 et seq. (Westlaw current through P.A. 94-89 of
the 2005 Reg. Sess.) (describing the powers of the Illinois Attorney General).
“person who suffers actual damage . . . [to recover] actual economic damages or any other relief
which the court deems proper,”177 including “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.”178 In other
states, the notification obligation is enforced by various means, such as administrative179 or
civil180 fines or an action by the attorney general181 to recover “direct economic damages”182 or to
remedy deceptive trade practices.183
In states not expressly providing for civil liability to data subjects, it may be possible to
rely upon a notification statute that does not expressly create a private right of action as the basis
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184 See Part II-B, supra (discussing general principles of negligence per se).
185 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105, Ar. Legis. 1526 (2005) (detailing the
acceptability of various methods of providing notice, including written notice, e-mail notice, and
types of “substitute notice”).
186 For example, the Delaware law provides that “an individual or a commercial entity
that maintains its own notice procedures as part of an information security policy for the
treatment of personal information, and whose procedures are otherwise consistent with the
timing requirements of this chapter is deemed to be in compliance with the notice requirements
of this chapter if the individual or the commercial entity notifies affected Delaware residents in
accordance with its policies in the event of a breach of security of the system.”  DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 12B-103(a), De. Legis. 61 (2005).  See also GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-911(3), Ga. Legis.
163 (2005) (similar).
187 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-912(c), Ga. Legis. 163 (2005) (providing that
notification “may be delayed if a law enforcement agency determines that the notification will
compromise a criminal investigation” and “shall be made after the law enforcement agency
determines that it will not compromise the investigation”).
188 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 530/10, Il. Legis. 94-36 (2005) (emphasis added).
189 2005 CONN. LEGIS. SERV. P.A. 05-148  § 3(b) (S.S.B. 650), Ct. Legis. P.A. 05-148.
190 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(10)(a), Fl. Legis. 2005-229.  “Any person [who] . . .
fails to maintain the documentation for the full 5 years as required in this subsection is liable for
an administrative fine in the amount of up to $50,000 for such failure.”  Id. at § 817.5681(10)(b).
for a suit alleging negligence per se.184 State security breach notification laws, unlike the federal
GLBA and related regulations discussed in Part II-B-1, may be found to be sufficiently specific
to avoid allegations that they are too vague to set the standard of care.  The laws require prompt
action and typically spell out in detail how notification is to be given.185 The laws do, however,
allow certain variations.  
The state notification statutes often permit database possessors to adopt their own
notification procedures that comply with the notice and timing requirements of the statute.186 
They also allow for a delay in notification to accommodate the needs of law enforcement187 or
other important considerations.  For example, the Illinois Personal Information Protection Act
requires that “notification shall be made in the most expedient time possible and without
unreasonable delay, consistent with any measures necessary to determine the scope of the breach
and restore the reasonable integrity, security, and confidentiality of the data system.”188
However, this type of language does not question whether there is a duty, but simply allows for a
nuanced analysis of whether there has been a breach.
More importantly, some of the security breach notification laws create unlikelihood-of-
harm exceptions to the disclosure obligation.  For example, the Connecticut law states that
“notification shall not be required if, after an appropriate investigation and consultation with
relevant federal, state and local agencies responsible for law enforcement, the person reasonably
determines that the breach will not likely result in harm to the individuals whose personal
information has been acquired and accessed.”189 The Florida law requires such a determination
to “be documented in writing and the documentation must be maintained for 5 years.”190 These
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191 See RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 15
(Proposed Final Draft 2005) (discussing the role of excuse in negligence per se).
192 ME. REV. STAT. § 1346 et seq., Me. Legis. 379 (2005).
193 Maine provides that a violation may result in “A. A fine of not more than $500 per
violation, up to a maximum of $2,500 for each day the information broker is in violation of this
chapter; B. Equitable relief; or C. Enjoinment from further violations.”  ME. REV. STAT. §
1349(1), Me. Legis. 379 (2005).
194 See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-07, N.D. Legis. 447 (2005) (providing that the
“attorney general may enforce this chapter,” but that the “remedies, duties, prohibitions, and
penalties of this chapter are not exclusive and are in addition to all other causes of action,
remedies, and penalties . . . provided by law”).
195 ME. REV. STAT. § 1349(3), Me. Legis. 379 (2005).
196 S. 115, 109th Cong. (2005), 2005 Cong. U.S. S 115.
197 Id. at § 3(b)(3) & 5 (stating that “[t]he rights and remedies available under this
subsection are cumulative and shall not affect any other rights and remedies available under
law”).
198 S. 1332, 109th Cong. (2005), 2005 Cong. U.S. S. 1332, § 401 et seq.
types of exceptions limit the utility of a negligence per se analysis in some states.  Under such a
law, a defendant’s reasonable determination that there was no likelihood of harm would
presumably mean either that there was no violation of the statute as a result of non-disclosure of
a security breach or that there was an excuse for any violation that occurred.191 Either finding
would be fatal to a negligence per se action.
Some state notification statutes not expressly providing for civil liability, such as the
Maine Notice of Risk to Personal Data Act,192 appear to leave room for courts to entertain
negligence per se actions by ruling out arguments that statutorily created penalties193 are
intended to be the sole measure of a database possessor’s obligations.194 The Maine act states
that “rights and remedies available under . . . [the statute] are cumulative and do not affect or
prevent rights and remedies available under federal or state law”195 
At the federal level, legislation has been introduced, but not yet adopted, that would
“require Federal agencies, and persons engaged in interstate commerce, in possession of
electronic data containing personal information, to disclose any unauthorized acquisition of such
information.”196 That bill, introduced by Senator Diane Feinstein, would pre-empt inconsistent
state legislation, but does not expressly provide that adversely affected data subjects can
maintain a civil action to recover damages.197 Another bill, proposed by Senator Arlan Spector,
would subject businesses maintaining records relating to 10,000 or more persons to certain data
protection and breach notification requirements and, among other enforcement mechanisms,
would allow a state attorney general to maintain an action in federal court for “damages in the
sum of actual damages, restitution, or other compensation on behalf of affected residents of the
State; and . . . punitive damages, if the violation is willful or intentional.”198
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199 See note 9, supra.
200 However, the defendant may indirectly benefit, such as by protecting its reputation
through candor.
201 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-101(4), De. Legis. 61 (2005) (providing that
“‘notice’ means:  (i) written notice; (ii) telephonic notice; (iii) electronic notice, if the notice
provided is consistent with . . . [certain federal laws]; or (iv) substitute notice, if the individual or
the commercial entity required to provide notice demonstrates that the cost of providing notice
will exceed $75,000, or that the affected class of Delaware residents to be notified exceeds
100,000 residents, or that the individual or the commercial entity does not have sufficient contact
information to provide notice.  Substitute notice consists of all of the following:  a. e-mail notice
. . .; and b. conspicuous posting of the notice on the Web site page of the individual or the
commercial entity if the individual or the commercial entity maintains one; and c. notice to
major statewide media”).
B.  Basic Tort Principles
1.  General Duty or Limited Duty
Part II-C discussed how general tort principles and policies can be marshaled to support
judicial recognition of a duty to protect database information.  Many of those same
arguments–particularly the reasoning relating to foreseeability of danger, opportunity to prevent
harm, relationship between the parties (at least in business contexts), deterrence of future losses,
desirable community consequences, and the availability of insurance–have equal application to
the question of whether a database possessor has a duty to disclose intrusion to data subjects. 
Those policies favor judicial recognition of a notification duty.  However, whether the burden
that would be placed on the defendant would be too heavy to bear requires special consideration
since the costs of providing notice will obviously differ from the costs of protecting a computer
database.
Depending on the number of affected data subjects, the costs of notification might be
substantial.  Some breaches of security involve a risk to tens or hundreds of thousands of
persons.199 Notifying each of the affected individuals separately might be difficult, time-
consuming, and labor intensive.  In addition, unlike the costs of database protection, the expense
of notification does not directly200 benefit the database possessor.  Indeed, disclosure of the
breach may precipitate adverse publicity and loss of business.
The states that have passed security breach notification laws have shown how the burden
imposed on database possessors can be minimized, in some contexts, through use of alternate
modes of notification.201 The same type of alternatives–which allow for aggregate methods of
communication when personal notice would be too expensive or otherwise infeasible–should be
taken into account in determining whether a common-law notification duty should be imposed
and, if so, whether that duty has been breached.
A key question in determining whether notification should be required is whether
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202 RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 18 cmt. b
(Proposed Final Draft 2005) (stating that “[i]n some situations a warning is desirable because it
is effective in reducing the likelihood of an accident. Yet in other situations a warning is
appropriate mainly because it reduces the likely severity of the injuries that such an accident
might occasion”).
203 RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 18 cmt. b
(Proposed Final Draft 2005) (indicating that “in some situations, however, there is little or
nothing a potential victim can do even if given a warning. For example, if a golfer’s errant shot
heads in the direction of a freeway next to the golf course, it would be pointless for the golfer to
give a ‘fore’ warning to motorists on the freeway”).
204 Cf. FTC website, supra note 5 (discussing what to do if you think your identity has
been stolen).
205 P.L. No. 108-159 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 15 and 20 U.S.C.).
206 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-1 (current through P.L. 109-33, Jul. 12, 2005).
207 2005 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 342 § 1(1) (S.B. 5418), Wash. Legis. 342 (2005).  “The
consumer reporting agency . . . shall provide the consumer with a unique personal identification
number or password to be used by the consumer when providing authorization for the release of
his or her credit report for a specific party or period of time.”  Id. at § 1(4).  See also 2005 CONN.
LEGIS. SERV. P.A. 05-148 § 2 (S.S.B. 650), Ct. Legis. P.A. 05-148 (detailing security freeze
procedures).
208 See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 48.202, Tx. Legis. 294 (2005) (detailing process).
209 See Kathleen Pender, Credit Reports - Free for All, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Tues.
Nov. 30, 2004 (describing Experian’s credit-monitoring product, called Triple Alert, which
provides customers with same-day notification anytime someone seeks credit in their name).  
210 But see Hayes v. California, 113 Cal. Rptr. 599, 602 (Cal. 1974) (holding that there
was no duty to warn students of the risk of an attack on the beach at night because “the public is
aware of the incidence of violent crime, particularly in unlit and little used places” and “it would
disclosure of the breach would be useful202 or futile.203 If there is nothing a data subject could do
to protect his or her own interests following an intrusion into data security, there would be little
reason to require notification.  However, it is indeed possible for individuals to act to protect
themselves from financial and physical harm that might be caused by persons with unauthorized
access to their data.204 The federal Fair and Accurate Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA)205
allows a consumer to place a “fraud alert”206 in his or her files with credit reporting agencies. 
Certain state laws also enable a consumer to place a “security freeze” on his or her credit report,
which “prohibits the consumer reporting agency from releasing the consumer’s credit report or
any information from it without the express authorization of the consumer.”207 Some state laws
permit victims of information security breaches to obtain a court order declaring the individual a
victim of identity theft.208 Such a declaration can aid the data subject in dealing with law
enforcement authorities or businesses.   A consumer can also monitor his or her credit card and
bank accounts more closely for evidence of unauthorized transactions or pay a monthly service
fee to a company which tracks three national credit reporting companies on a daily basis and
advises subscribers of key changes to their data (such as new applications for credit by someone
using the subscriber’s name and identity).209 As to physical harm, a person who has been warned
of data intrusion can exercise greater caution for personal safety, if the facts so warrant.210
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serve little purpose . . . to further remind the public of this unfortunate circumstance in society”).
211 “The range of defendant conduct that can give rise to the obligation to warn is so
broad as to make clear that the failure to warn is a basic form of negligence.”  RESTATEMENT,
THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 18 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft 2005)
(offering diverse examples).  See also RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §
2(c) (1998) (discussing product liability based on failure to warn); id. at § 10 (providing that
“[o]ne engaged in the business of selling . . . products is subject to liability for harm . . . caused
by the seller’s failure to provide a warning after the time of sale . . . if a reasonable person in the
seller’s position would provide such a warning”).
212 See RESTATEMENT, SECOND, OF TORTS § 342 cmt. d (1965) (stating that “the licensee
. . . is entitled to expect nothing more than a disclosure of the conditions which he will meet if he
. . . enters, in so far as those conditions are known to the giver of the privilege”).
213 See RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 41
Reporter’s Note to cmt. g (Proposed Final Draft 2005) (stating that in “Tarasoff” cases, “[s]ome
courts have declined to adopt a duty beyond that of warning.  A substantial number of courts,
and legislatures enacting statutes, limit the duty to warning the potential victim”).
214 If a duty to warn is imposed as a matter of common law principles, there are many
open questions relating to the method for conveying the warning and the specificity of the
message.  In the absence of a governing statute, whether the database possessor acted reasonably
will be determined on a case by case basis.  However, attorneys advising clients on what they
must do to avoid liability might do well to keep in mind that the Guidance states:
If the institution determines that misuse of its information about a customer has occurred
or is reasonably possible, it should notify the affected customer as soon as possible. 
Customer notice may be delayed if an appropriate law enforcement agency determines
that notification will interfere with a criminal investigation and provides the institution
with a written request for the delay.  However, the institution should notify its customers
as soon as notification will no longer interfere with the investigation.
Id.
In many circumstances, American tort law has imposed liability for failure to warn.211 
Indeed, courts have sometimes held that there is a duty to warn even when there is no duty to do
anything else.  For example, in many states that still follow the traditional categories relating to
premises liability–trespasser, licensee, and invitee–the only duty a possessor of land owes to a
licensee is to warn of dangers of which the possessor is aware.212 Similarly, in some states,
essentially the only duty of a mental health professional who knows that his or her patient poses
a risk of harm to a third person is to warn the third person (or authorities) of the danger.213 
Consequently, it might reasonably be urged that even if a state holds that there is no duty to
protect databases from intrusion, there should at least be a duty to provide notice when the
security of the database has been breached.214
There is an important question as to how specific the notice should be that informs data
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215 See Supplement A to Appendix B to Part 30 Interagency Guidance on Response
Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice 12 CFR Pt.
30, App. B (Westlaw current through July 1, 2005) (hereinafter “Interagency Guidance”) (setting
forth guidance jointly issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the
Office of Thrift Supervision interpreting the GLBA and related provisions).   The Guidance
opines that financial institutions have a duty to notify customers of a breach of data security.  See
id. (providing that “[w]here an incident of unauthorized access to customer information involves
customer information systems maintained by an institution’s service providers, it is the
responsibility of the financial institution to notify the institution’s customers and regulator”).
216 Interagency Guidance, supra note 215. More specifically, the document provides:
The notice should include the following additional items, when appropriate:
a.  A recommendation that the customer review account statements and
immediately report any suspicious activity to the institution;
b.  A description of fraud alerts and an explanation of how the customer may
place a fraud alert in the customer’s consumer reports to put the customer’s creditors on
notice that the customer may be a victim of fraud;
c.  A recommendation that the customer periodically obtain credit reports from
each nationwide credit reporting agency and have information relating to fraudulent
transactions deleted;
d.  An explanation of how the customer may obtain a credit report free of charge;
and
e.  Information about the availability of the FTC’s online guidance regarding
steps a consumer can take to protect against identity theft.  The notice should encourage
the customer to report any incidents of identity theft to the FTC, and should provide the
FTC’s Web site address and toll-free telephone number that customers may use to obtain
the identity theft guidance and report suspected incidents of identity theft.
Id.  The Interagency Guidance adds that:
Customer notice should be delivered in any manner designed to ensure that a
customer can reasonably be expected to receive it.  For example, the institution may
choose to contact all customers affected by telephone or by mail, or by electronic mail
for those customers for whom it has a valid e-mail address and who have agreed to
subjects that their data has been accessed.  In this regard, the federal Interagency Guidance215 for
financial institutions offers an informative, pro-consumer perspective.  The Interagency
Guidance states:
Customer notice should be given in a clear and conspicuous manner.  The notice should
describe the incident in general terms and the type of customer information that was the
subject of unauthorized access or use.  It also should generally describe what the
institution has done to protect the customers’ information from further unauthorized
access.  In addition, it should include a telephone number that customers can call for
further information and assistance.  The notice also should remind customers of the need
to remain vigilant over the next twelve to twenty-four months, and to promptly report
incidents of suspected identity theft to the institution.216
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receive communications electronically.
Id.
217 See Sharff v. Pioneer Financial Service, Inc., 1993 W.L. 87718, *6-*7 (N.D. Ill)
(recognizing the rule and holding there was a question of fact as to whether the defendant failed
to correct a representation that the plaintiff would be given a performance review); Stevens v.
Marco, 305 P.2d 669, 683 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (citations omitted) (stating that “one who
learns that his statements, even if thought to be true when made, have become false through a
change in circumstances, has the duty, before his statements are acted upon, to disclose the new
conditions to the party relying on his original representations”); St. Joseph Hosp. v. Corbetta
Constr. Co., 316 N.E.2d 51, 71 (Ill. App. Ct.1974) (stating that “where one has made a statement
which at that time is true but subsequently acquires new information which makes it untrue or
misleading, he must disclose such information to anyone whom he knows to be acting on the
basis of the original statement–or be guilty of fraud or deceit”); Mahan v. Greenwood, 108
S.W.3d 467, 494 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding that an attorney had a duty to correct any
misimpressions caused by his earlier statements); 2 FOWLER V. HARPER et al., THE LAW OF
TORTS § 7.14, at 476 (2d ed. 1986).  See also First Nat. Bk. of Elgin v. Nilles, 35 B.R. 409, 411
(D.C. Ill. 1983) (stating that “one who makes an incorrect statement he has reason to believe
another is relying upon is under a duty to correct it”).
218 See RESTATEMENT, SECOND, OF TORTS § 551 cmt. h (1977) (providing that “[o]ne
who, having made a representation which when made was true or believed to be so, remains
silent after he has learned that it is untrue and that the person to whom it is made is relying upon
it in a transaction with him, is morally and legally in the same position as if he knew that his
statement was false when made”) (emphasis added).
219 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying California law).
220 651 F.2d at 468.
2.  The Obligation to Correct Previous Statements
There is a duty to update previous statements that were intended to induce reliance and
which, though true when made, have become false or misleading as a result of subsequent
developments.217 The duty extends until the recipient of the information is no longer able to
protect his or her own interests by foregoing reliance on the now-erroneous representation of the
fact.218 The purpose of the rule is to avoid deception that causes harm.
The operation of this rule can be illustrated by a case from another context, McGrath v.
Zenith Radio Corp.219 In that case, the defendants had told the plaintiff executive that he was the
“heir apparent” to the presidency of a soon-to-be-acquired subsidiary.  However, before the
executive released his shares of stock and options to facilitate the acquisition, the defendants
learned that there were serious doubts as to whether the plaintiff would ever become president. 
They did not disclose those developments.  In an opinion by Chief Judge Thomas E. Fairchild,
the Seventh Circuit upheld a judgment in favor of the executive, for in releasing his options and
selling his shares he had relied on the assurances that others thought he would be the new
corporate head and was never advised to the contrary.  “The making of the original statements,
the discovery of their falsehood, and the failure to correct them before plaintiff relied on them
were ‘elements in a continuing course of conduct’ capable of establishing fraud.”220
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221 See notes 136 & 137, supra, and the accompanying text.
222 Cf. ABA Business Law Section, Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Trends in the Law of
Information Security, 2 CIPARETI No. 1 (Mar. 2005), at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL320010pub/newsletter/0006/ (last visited July 25,
2005) (stating that “government enforcement agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) have actively pursued companies for ‘deceptive’ trade practices whenever the information
security representations they voluntarily make to the public do not match their actual security
practices”).
223 See ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR FRAUD 20 (3d. ed. 2003)
(indicating that “dozens of cases are decided every year awarding economic loss damages for
fraud”); id. at 24-26 (discussing cases holding that the economic-loss rule does not apply to
misrepresentation claims). See also id. at 20 (stating that “[i]f the economic-loss rule is held to
bar damages for misrepresentation, the courts are saying that there is no difference between
deliberate lying, that is, common-law fraud, and innocent sales of goods that happen not to
conform to the contract”).
224 See id. at 20 (stating that “only a minority of states and a few federal courts have held
the economic loss rule applicable to fraud claims”).
225 See Part IV-A, infra.
226 See DUNN, supra footnote 223, at 18 (stating that “[t]here is no policy behind limiting
the damages recoverable against one who defrauds another to those damages that the party
committing the fraud might have been able to foresee at the time he or she made the
misrepresentation”).
227 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1381 (2000) (hereinafter “TORTS”.  But see
DUNN, supra footnote 223, at 170 (stating that “courts have been divided sharply in recent years
as to whether emotional distress is a recoverable element of damages for fraud).
Similarly, it might be argued that when businesses tell their customers–through
advertisements, websites, or published privacy policies221–that their personal data is secure, but
then learn information to the contrary, they have a duty to disclose those developments to their
customers.222 The customers have a choice as to whether to continue to their relationships with
the businesses in question.  There has been no irrevocable reliance by a customer, even though a
business-customer relationship is already in progress.  It is still possible to for the customer to
act to protect his or her interests by terminating the relationship and doing business elsewhere.
It is important to note that in McGrath and similar cases, the defendants were not guilty
of mere negligence, but of fraud.  In fraud actions, economic losses are routinely recoverable,223
except in a minority of states.224 Consequently, if a duty to speak is imposed under this theory,
the scope of liability may not be limited by the economic-loss rule, discussed below,225 or by
usual requirements of foreseeability.226 In addition, “[e]motional harm damages are not
ordinarily recoverable in a misrepresentation action,”227 and thus the issues addressed in Part IV-
B may be irrelevant under this theory of liability.
3.  Conduct Creating a Continuing Risk of Physical Harm
It is well established that where a person’s prior conduct creates a continuing risk of
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228 See RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 39
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005) (providing that “[w]hen an actor’s prior conduct, even though
not tortious, creates a continuing risk of physical harm of a type characteristic of the conduct, the
actor has a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent or minimize the harm”); see also
RESTATEMENT, SECOND, OF TORTS § 321 (1965) (stating that “(1) If the actor does an act, and
subsequently realizes or should realize that it has created an unreasonable risk of causing
physical harm to another, he is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from
taking effect.  (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies even though at the time of the act the
actor has no reason to believe that it will involve such a risk”).
229 See RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 39
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005) (“even though not tortious”).
230 Cf. RESTATEMENT, SECOND, OF TORTS § 321 illus. 3 (1965) (indicating that a driver
involved in a skidding accident has a duty to warn on-coming drivers).
231 See La Raia v. Superior Ct., 722 P.2d 286, 290 (Ariz. 1986) (stating that “[h]aving
caused or contributed to plaintiff’s poisoning, defendant was under a duty to act reasonably to
mitigate the resulting harm”).
232 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 14, at 93 (noting that “[t]he predominant injury in a
cybertort case is a financial loss”).
233 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003).
physical harm there is a duty to render assistance to keep the harm from occurring or mitigate
adverse consequences.228 This duty exists even if the prior conduct was not tortious.229 Thus, a
driver involved in an auto accident must stop to render assistance, regardless of whether he or
she was at fault for the collision.230 Likewise, a landlord who sprays an apartment, carelessly or
not, with a pesticide that makes a tenant ill is obliged to disclose its contents, in response to a
request, to aid medical care of the tenant.231
The harm caused by intrusions into computerized personal data typically is more
economic than physical in nature.232 Yet misuse of improperly accessed personal data can result
in a physical attack on a data subject or physical harm to property.  Hacking of a newspaper’s
records, for example, may reveal when a customer’s paper will be on “vacation hold” and
thereby lead to a burglary while the customer is away on vacation.
In Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc.,233 an Internet-based investigation service obtained a
woman’s workplace address not through hacking, but by placing a pretext phone call and duping
her into revealing her employment information.  The party who purchased the data from the
service then went to the workplace and killed the woman.  The court held that an information
broker who sells data pertaining to a person owes a duty of care to that person when disclosing
the information to a client.  In cases like Remsburg, where personal data leads to physical harm,
information might be obtained by hacking personal data in possession of a third party, thus
potentially bringing the increased-risk-of-harm rule into play.
As articulated by the new Restatement, the existence of a duty of reasonable care under
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234 RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 39 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1 2005).
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 39 cmt. c
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
238 Cf. Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Pre-Contractual
Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 70, 127 (1993) (stating that a “party who owes . . . [a]
confidential or fiduciary duty has an obligation to divulge or disclose during negotiations all
material facts concerning the transaction within his knowledge”).
this rule depends upon (1) “prior conduct,”234 which (2) “creates a continuing risk of physical
harm,”235 that is (3) “of a type characteristic of the conduct.”236 Where improperly accessed
computerized data is used to cause physical harm, the database possessor’s “prior conduct” is the
maintenance of the information in a form where one of the foreseeable risks is unauthorized
intrusion.  That conduct may qualify as tortious (if the database possessor has been careless in
safeguarding the data) or it may be innocent (if the database possessor has exercised reasonable
care or was under no duty to do so).  It makes no difference.  The loss of the data creates some
risk of physical harm to data subjects–often not a great risk, but not a negligible risk either.  If
the conduct and risk requirements are satisfied, the question is then whether, if physical harm
occurs, it is a type of harm “characteristic of the conduct.”  Concerning this requirement, the
Restatement commentary offers guidance:
The conduct must . . . be sufficiently connected with the potential for later harm that
imposing a duty to prevent or mitigate the harm is appropriate. . . . [I]t is unfair to impose
this duty when the actor’s conduct has not generally increased the risk of harm . . . or is
quite removed from the risks that pose harm to the other . . . .237
Whether a defendant’s practices in maintaining a database have sufficiently “increased
the risk of harm” to the data subject, or are too far “removed” from those risks, are matters that
will depend heavily on the specific facts.  In some cases, the connection between the defendant’s
role in the loss of the information and the resulting threatened physical harm may be sufficiently
great as to give rise to a duty to warn the data subject that the security of his or her personal
information has been breached.  This theory of liability is only applicable in cases where the data
subject suffers physical harm.  However, if personal injuries are inflicted, the amount of
damages may be great.
C. Fiduciary Duty of Candor
A fiduciary relationship imposes a duty of candor.  The fiduciary must exercise
reasonable care to reveal all material information to the person to whom the duty is owed.238
Indeed, when the interests of the fiduciary and the beneficiary are adversely aligned, fiduciary
principles may require something more than reasonable care, perhaps a degree of
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239 Cf. Johnson, Candor, supra note 143, at 771 (stating that in legal representation a
“duty of ‘absolute and perfect candor’ applies most forcefully in instances where the interest of
the attorney and client are adverse”).
240 There are difficult questions as to how far a fiduciary’s duty of candor extends.  The
duty is limited by considerations relating to scope of the relationship, materiality, prior
knowledge of the information, competing obligations to others, consent, and likelihood of harm. 
See Johnson, Candor, supra note 143, at 778-92.   For a discussion of whether a lawyer must tell
a client that the lawyer may have committed malpractice, see id. at 773 & n.182.
241 See Part II-D, supra.
242 John J. Laubmeier, Demystifying Wisconsin’s Economic Loss Doctrine, 2005 WIS. L.
REV. 225, 225 (noting that “the application of the doctrine is a constantly developing area of law,
which may not be fully understood by judges, lawyers, or the public at large”).
forthcomingness that approximates “absolute and perfect candor.”239
If a database possessor owes fiduciary obligations to a data subject (as in the case of an
attorney and client), it seems clear that the possessor must disclose information relating to a
breach of database security.  The interests of the fiduciary and the data subject are in potential
conflict because there are important questions as to whether the possessor may be held
responsible for the loss of the data.  The law requires the fiduciary to subordinate his or her
personal interests to the interests of the data subject.240 Non-disclosure would be inconsistent
with those heavy obligations.
This theory of notification duty, like the earlier discussion of whether fiduciaries have a
duty to safeguard computerized personal information,241 has limited applicability.  It does not
govern the general run of commercial cases.  However, it may be of great importance in cases
involving lawyers, physicians, and other fiduciaries who maintain computerized records
containing personal data relating to clients, patients, and beneficiaries.
IV.  Limiting Cybersecurity Tort Liability
Assuming that a database possessor has breached a duty to protect personal data or reveal
information of unauthorized access to computerized information, how far should tort liability
extend?  Should an affected data subject be able to recover as damages amounts for economic
losses or emotional distress resulting from the breach?  If these or other substantial damages are
ordinarily recoverable, is there anything the defendant database possessor can do, between the
time of the breach and the moment of harm, to minimize its exposure to tort liability?  These
issues are considered in the following subparts.
A.  The Economic-Loss Rule
The economic-loss rule is an “obscure,”242 but important, legal doctrine which holds that
a plaintiff may not recover economic losses resulting from negligence that are unaccompanied
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243 See Ann O’Brien, Note, Limited Recovery Rule as a Dam: Preventing a Flood of
Litigation for Negligent Infliction of Pure Economic Loss, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 959 (1989)
(stating a similar definition).  See also Dunn, supra footnote 223, at 19 (stating that “[i]n the last
ten years or so, most courts have held . . . economic loss unaccompanied by property damage or
personal injury not be recoverable in an action alleging negligence or strict liability in the
manufacture of a product”).
244 See Rustad, supra note 2, 6, at 113 (opining that “[t]he economic loss rule adopted by
most courts is a barrier to tort recovery for Internet-related security breaches”).
245 See JAY M. FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE: LIABILITY OF PROFESSIONALS AND
BUSINESSES TO THIRD PARTIES FOR ECONOMIC LOSS 12 (1995) (hereinafter “ECONOMIC
NEGLIGENCE”) (stating that a “distinctive feature of economic negligence cases is the fear of
indeterminate liability” meaning both “indeterminacy of the number of potential plaintiffs . . .
and the size of their claims”); id. at § 1.3.2 (discussing the threat of indeterminate liability).
246 See Bain v. Gillispie, 357 N.W.2d 47 (Iowa App. 1984) (holding that injury to
novelty store owners’ business interests was not a reasonably foreseeable result of a college
basketball referee’s call which had effect of eliminating the local team from the conference
championship; no liability for “malpractice”).
247 See Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) (denying recovery
to persons who incurred additional shipping costs when a bridge collapsed as a result of multiple
acts of negligence).
248 See RESTATEMENT, SECOND, OF TORTS § 766C (1977) (stating that “[o]ne is not liable
to another for pecuniary harm not deriving from physical harm to the other, if that harm results
from the actor’s negligently (a) causing a third person not to perform a contract with the other, or
(b) interfering with the other’s performance of his contract or making the performance more
expensive or burdensome, or (c) interfering with the other’s acquiring a contractual relation with
a third person”); id. at cmt a (opining that courts “apparently have been influenced by . . . the
fear of an undue burden upon the defendant’s freedom of action, the probable disproportion
by physical damage to the plaintiff’s person or property.243 Obviously, if the economic-loss rule
applies to cybersecurity cases, it has the potential to greatly limit the scope of recoverable
damages.244 Consequently, it is important to understand the policies underlying the rule and the
precise nature of its restrictions.  Viewed from the standpoint of public policy, the economic-loss
rule serves three very different functions:  avoidance of too broad a scope of liability; insistence
that damages be proved with certainty; and definition of the doctrinal boundary between contract
law and torts.
First, somewhat crudely, the economic-loss rule protects potential defendants from the
risk of a disproportionately wide range of liability.245 This is an important function, for acts of
negligence often have broad adverse economic consequences.  There would be no sensible
stopping point to tort liability if a referee who negligently makes a bad call that eliminates a
team from the playoffs were liable for the lost profits of merchants who sell team-related items246
or if a person who causes an auto accident were responsible for all of the economic losses that
result from the delays of persons tied up in traffic.247 Not surprisingly, the Restatement provides,
as a general rule, that there is no liability for negligent interference with contracts or
economically promising relations.248 According to Professor Jay M. Feinman:
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between the large damages that might be recovered and the extent of the defendant’s fault, and
perhaps in some cases the difficulty of determining whether the interference has in fact resulted
from the negligent conduct”).
249 FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE, supra footnote 245, at 18.
250 Cf. J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 410 (Cal. 1979) (stating that “[t]he
chief dangers . . . in allowing recovery for negligent interference with prospective economic
advantage are the possibility of excessive liability, the creation of an undue burden on freedom
of action, the possibility of fraudulent or collusive claims and the often speculative nature of
damages”; emphasis added). 
251 This is not the only occasion when the law employs a rather blunt rule to limit the
scope of tort liability.  In some states, for example, there is no liability for negligent infliction of
emotional distress unless the plaintiff suffers some form of physical impact or physical
consequences.  See Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 801 P.2d 37 (Idaho 1990) (holding that a
son could not recover for distress allegedly resulting from mortuary’s negligent loss of the
cremated remains of his father absent physical manifestations of injury); Bader v. Johnson, 732
N.E.2d 1212, 1221-22 (Ind. 2000) (indicating that Indiana continues to adhere to a modified
impact rule).  
252 But see DUNN, supra footnote 223, at 18-19 (stating that “[t]he rule that precludes
recovery of uncertain and speculative damages applies where the fact of damages is uncertain,
not where the amount is uncertain. . . .  Computation of the amount is for the trier of fact”).
253 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 33, at 7-9 (stating that “[i]t has often been urged
that . . . [t]ort law should be administratively convenient and efficient, and should avoid
intractable inquiries. Only a limited amount of resources can be devoted to the administration of
justice in any society. This principle holds that tort rules should be shaped so that the dollars
spent on accident compensation are efficiently employed. Thus, legal standards should not be so
complex or uncertain that their application entails an undue expenditure of judicial resources or
imposes unnecessarily high litigation costs on parties. So, too, convenience and efficiency
discourage the pursuit of what might be called intractable inquiries, matters where the facts are
such that even after expenditure of considerable time and money, there is a substantial risk that
an erroneous result will be reached”).
[I]ndeterminacy [of the scope of liability in economic negligence cases] is a concern not
in and of itself but through its relation to fundamental tort policies.  When liability is
indeterminate, arguably the deterrence, loss distribution, and fairness policies are
undermined.249
Second, lost economic opportunities are often not readily susceptible to precise
calculation.250 Yet, the law insists that damages must be proved with reasonable certainty.  The
economic-loss rule, by ruling out litigation in a huge range of cases (suits where there is no
personal injury or property damage), helps to ensure (again somewhat crudely)251 that
compensation is not awarded for amounts that are speculative.252 In the process of doing so, the
economic-loss rule promotes judicious use of limited judicial resources.  Those scarce assets are
not squandered on the burdensome, and perhaps dubious, task of trying to quantify endless
economic losses that may, in truth, not be provable with reasonable precision.253
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254 See note 29, supra. See also FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE, supra footnote 245,
at § 1.3.3 (discussing the protection of private ordering); Kevin J. Breer & Justin D. Pulikkan,
The Economic Loss Rule in Kansas and its Impact on Construction Cases, 74-JUN J. KAN. B.A.
30, 31 (2005) (stating that “[t]he economic loss rule can be justified for three reasons: (1) it
maintains a ‘fundamental distinction between tort and contract law;’ (2) it protects commercial
party’s freedom to ‘allocate economic risk by contract;’ and (3) it encourages ‘the parties best
situated to assess the risk of economic loss’ and to ‘assume, allocate, or insure against the
risk’”).
255 East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986)
(citing G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87-94 (1974)).  See generally Vincent R.
Johnson, Liberating Progress and the Free Market from the Specter of Tort Liability, 83 NW. U.
L. REV. 1026, 1030 (1989) (stating that, according to one legal commentator, “ever-more-
generous incarnations of tort law ascended to the throne of accident compensation following the
decline of privity, the narrowing construction of disclaimers, and the widely heralded ‘death of
contract’”).
256 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 33, at 9 (noting that it has often been urged that the
law should be shaped to “promote individual responsibility” and to encourage persons “to
employ available resources to protect their own interests, rather than depend on others to save
them from harm”).
257 476 U.S. 858 (1986).  See also Glaub Jewelers, Inc. v. New York Daily News, 535
N.Y.S.2d 532 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1988) (holding that a newspaper that negligently failed to publish
an advertisement for a business was not liable in tort for the business’s lost sales).
Third and most importantly, the economic-loss rule marks the boundary line between
contract law and tort law.254 Delineating these two bodies of law is vital for otherwise there is a
risk that “contract law would drown in a sea of tort.”255 The law of contracts has meaning only
because entering into agreements has legal consequences.  One of those consequences is that if a
person makes a bad deal, he or she usually must suffer the result.  This reality creates an
incentive for contracting parties to exercise diligence to protect their own interests.256 If a party
who strikes a disadvantageous bargain could successfully complain that he or she should recover
damages because the other side failed to exercise reasonable care to protect his or her interests, a
great part of contract law would be rendered superfluous.
The best example of how the economic-loss rule distinguishes contract claims from torts
is a case involving a defective product, East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval.257 
That suit, which eventually reached the nation’s highest court, involved a defective component
part of a turbine which damaged only the turbine itself.  There was no harm to any person or to
“other” property of the plaintiffs.  The action sought damages in tort for the cost of repairs to the
turbine and for lost profits because statutes of limitations had already barred contract claims. 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Harry Blackmun, held that a manufacturer has no
tort duty under negligence or strict liability to prevent a product from injuring itself.  Those types
of harm are merely economic losses that can be insured against or otherwise addressed by the
parties while negotiating the contract.  Only product defects that result in harm to property other
than the product itself or in personal injury are cognizable under the law of torts.  The law of
warranty provides sufficient protection for the benefits of the bargain.
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photocopying, gasoline, and the like, as well as the cost of obtaining court documentation that
one is the victim of identity theft.
259 See Stop Thieves, supra note 1, at 12 (stating that victims of identity theft “typically
lose $800 and spend two years clearing their names”).
260 See Texas Bill Analysis, supra note 4.
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262 See footnote 246, supra, and the accompanying text.
263 See footnote 247, supra, and the accompanying text.
With these three policy considerations in mind–scope of liability, certainty of damages,
and delineation of contact-versus-tort–the question is then whether the economic-loss rule should
apply to cybersecurity cases and, if so, what claims for damages might be barred.  Answering
those questions involves consideration of the types of economic losses that may arise in these
cases, as well as the efficacy of contract law and the insurance market in addressing such losses. 
Unauthorized use of personal information can result in many types of harm.  In cybersecurity
cases where breaches of security result in identity theft, the losses include, but are not limited to:
(1) out-of-pocket expenses incurred to restore a good credit rating; (2) personal time spent on
that task; and (3) lost opportunities resulting from bad credit. 
Focusing first on out-of-pocket losses,258 there is little policy justification for denying
recovery.  Various estimates currently peg these costs in a typical case at between $800259 and
$1400.260 Even though the amount out-of-pocket damages may vary from case to case, this
element of damages is susceptible to proof with a high degree of certainty.  The receipts are
gathered, a list is made, and the sum is totaled.  There is no reason relating to certainty of harm
to deny compensation for amounts actually and reasonably spent on the task of restoring a good
credit rating on the ground that out-of-pocket damages are speculative.
Nor does recovery of out-of-pocket costs present a case where the circle of liability needs
to be tightly circumscribed to prevent legal responsibility from being extended too far.  In many
cases, there will be a business relationship between the database possessor and damaged data
subject, and in other cases the relationship (presumably) will be sufficiently close that there was
some legitimate reason for the defendant to maintain a database containing personal information
about the plaintiff.261 These are not situations where some “stranger” in the community (e.g., the
vendor of the losing team’s products262 or the person tied up in traffic,263 mentioned above) is
seeking to recover damages.  If a database possessor wishes to constrict the scope of potential
liability, it may always do so by removing from its database the personal information of data
subjects.  But if it fails to do so, the courts should be reluctant to deny recovery of out-of-pocket
losses to data subjects whose interests were imperiled by the database possessor’s choice to
maintain personal information in a form where one of the risks was unauthorized access.
If, with respect to out-of-pocket losses, scope of liability and uncertainty of damages are
not significant considerations, the only question, so far as the economic-loss rule is concerned, is
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waiver of a provision of this subchapter is contrary to public policy, void, and unenforceable”);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(a) (Westlaw current through Ch. 33 of 2005 Reg. Sess. urgency
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265 R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 11-49.2-6(b) et seq., R.I. Legis. 05-225.
266 See Johnson, Liberating Progress, supra note 255, at 1044 (discussing the “the
inequalities of bargaining power which pervade many consumer transactions” and noting that
“[p]urveyors of goods and services frequently employ standardized contracts which leave
consumers little choice but to accept a deal as presented–including contractual terms which
purport to limit the provider’s liability to the consumer”).
267 Johnson, Liberating Progress, supra note 255, at 1042.
268 Johnson, Liberating Progress, supra note 255, at 1042.
whether the boundary-line between contracts and torts creates a good reason for a court to say
this is the type of loss that should be compensated only if there is a contractual obligation to do
so.  The answer to that question is “no.”
There is an emerging consensus reflected in the recently passed state security breach
notification statutes which suggests that rights relating to protection of personal data and
notification of security breaches are not proper subjects for bargaining between the parties. 
Many of the state laws,264 such as the Rhode Island Identity Theft Protection Act of 2005,265
provide that a waiver of the rights they give data subjects is against public policy, and therefore
void and unenforceable.  If that is true, it makes little sense to say that a consumer should
bargain and pay for the level of cybersecurity protection (and the right to sue for out-of-pocket
damages) that he or she desires.  Moreover, it is simply unrealistic to expect such bargaining to
occur between individual consumers and the large corporations that play a pervasive role in
modern life.  Individuals often lack both commercial leverage266 and the information necessary
to assess the risks that they face.  “[I]t would be entirely possible that despite good faith efforts
and the expenditure of considerable funds, a customer would fail to obtain a fully accurate and
complete picture of potential harms, with the result being an unintentional and undesired
assumption of risk by the consumer.”267 Moreover, in light of the ubiquity of computerized
databases, ordinary persons would have to devote a huge amount of energy to negotiating the
parameters of data protection with every potential defendant, if contract law were the only
solution to these types of problems.  As a result, “[c]onsumers would spend an inordinate
amount of resources on efforts to perform often duplicative, time-consuming tasks relating to
assessment of the risks of injury and the need for economic protection.”268
As an alternative to this sort of David-versus-an-army-of-Goliaths contractual model, a
better paradigm is one that is structured so that compensation for foreseeable and necessary out-
of-pocket losses is routinely recoverable from the tortfeasor.  Compensation of out-of-pocket
losses should not depend upon whether the data subject read the fine print in the defendant’s
privacy policy or bargained for a specific level of protection, but on the reasonableness of the
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269 Under contract law, consequential damages are not recoverable unless they were
specifically in the mind of the parties at the time the contract was entered into.  See DAN B.
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.4(5) (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the “contemplation of the parties
rule”).  Consequently, it would be difficult to recover out-of-pocket credit-repair damages under
a contractual theory of liability.
270 Stop Thieves, supra note 1, at 12.  “[P]olicies generally cover the expenses of
cleaning up the crime, including attorney’s fees, costs of mailing correspondence, and lost
wages.  They seldom cover the out-of-pocket loss to the victim. . . .”  Id. at 14.
271 See Texas Bill Analysis, supra note 4.  But see McMahon, supra note 3, at 626 n.5
(2004) (citing a 175-hour figure).
272 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 33, at 7 (stating that “[t]he proportionality principle
seeks to limit or refine application of the fault principle.  In part, it holds that liability should not
be levied on an individual tortfeasor, even if fault is shown, if doing so would expose the
defendant to a burden that is disproportionately heavy or perhaps unlimited”).  The
proportionality principle is one of the most important forces in modern American tort law.  To
avoid imposition of disproportionate liability, courts and legislatures have:  crafted limited-duty
rules (see RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES)
§ 41 Cmt. g Reporters’ Note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussed the sometimes-
limited duties of mental-health professionals); imposed what amount to “standing to sue”
amounts spent to restore a good credit rating.  This is a function that can be better performed by
tort law than by contracts.269 Moreover, the function is not one for which the insurance market
has yet offered an adequate substitute.  According to Consumer Reports, “ID theft insurance is
typically not worth paying for.”270
The preceding analysis of the propriety of out-of-pocket credit-repair damages can be
profitably contrasted with requests for recovery of compensation for time spent restoring one’s
good credit or for opportunities lost as a result of a bad credit rating.  Statistics show that victims
of identity theft spend 600 hours on average271 to restore their credit.  Obviously, the harm
suffered by these victims is tremendous.  Yet it is easy to see why it would be difficult to value
these lost hours.  If plaintiff’s time were compensated at his or her usual hourly rate of earnings
in employment or a profession, the awards made to professionals, minimum-wage workers, and
unemployed homemakers would vary widely–and perhaps without good reason.  Similarly, if
every victim were to receive the same amount for the value of lost time, how would that amount
be set?  Ensuring uniformity with respect to this element of damages is a task better committed
to legislatures than to the multitude of fact finders who will preside over numerous tort claims.
The problems of compensating for the value of lost opportunities–such as the lost chance
to buy a house, obtain a car loan, or open a cell-phone account–are also obvious.  How does one
prove precisely which opportunities were lost, and what they meant in economic terms to the
plaintiff?   In addition, there is a clear risk of imposing a range of liability that may be far too
wide.  Negligence requires only a momentary misstep, whether in the data protection arena or in
other contexts.  To say that a negligent database possessor should be liable to a broad class of
persons for all of their lost opportunities (as well as out-of-pocket and perhaps other damages as
well) would quickly pose a serious risk of liability disproportionate to fault.272 All of this
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requirements (see Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co., 336 S.E.2d 465, 467 (S.C. 1985) (stating
that in “bystander” cases seeking recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress “the
plaintiff and the victim must be closely related”); restricted the types of damages that are
recoverable (see Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242, 245 (Wis. 1974) (denying
recovery of child-rearing costs in failure-to-diagnose-pregnancy cases because that element of
damages would be “wholly out of proportion to the culpability involved”); embraced
comparative responsibility defenses (RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 25 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing the defense in
strict-liability cases); and limited recovery of damages to harm proximately caused (see
RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) Ch. 6
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing scope of liability).
273 Cf. People v. Ware, 2003 W.L. 22120898, *2 (Cal. Ct. App.) (affirming an award
against the perpetrator of restitutionary damages, including an amount for value of business
hours spent by the victim on repairing her damaged credit, because the legislature intended “that
a victim of crime who incurs any economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime shall
receive restitution directly from any defendant convicted of that crime”). 
274 “In the absence of physical damage, tort recovery for pure economic loss is limited to
‘wilful’ infliction of economic loss.” O’Brien, supra note 243, at 959-60.
275 See note 177, supra, and the accompanying text.
276 See JAY M. FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE, supra footnote 245, at 11 (1995)
(stating that “[t]he traditional view is that personal injury is qualitatively different from
economic loss because the former often has catastrophic consequences for the victim and
because monetary compensation is unable to wholly remedy injury of this kind; therefore,
negligence principles should be confined to cases of personal injury.  This view is now
controversial; it has been challenged by many courts. .. .”); CRITICAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 50 (opining that “[m]any courts . . . are beginning to reject
the economic loss doctrine. For example, in People Express Airline v. Consolidated Rail
Corporation [495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985)], the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that ‘a
defendant who has breached his duty of care to avoid the risk of economic injury to particularly
foreseeable plaintiffs may be held liable for actual economic losses that are proximately caused
by its breach of duty’”).
suggests that there is greater reason for courts to apply the economic-loss rule to bar claims for
lost time and lost opportunities than to hold that out-of-pocket losses are not recoverable.
In any event, the economic-loss rule, as defined in most states, has important limits. 
First, it bars only claims for economic harm caused for negligence.273 It therefore may be
possible to avoid the rule by proving more culpable conduct, such as recklessness or intentional
wrong-doing.274 Second, the economic-loss rule is a common-law doctrine that does not preempt
legislative provisions to the contrary.  Liability for negligently caused economic harm may be
actionable pursuant to statute.  At least one state, Illinois,275 expressly allows for recovery of
economic losses in cybersecurity cases.  Third, many types of harm caused by intrusion are not
purely economic.  Thus, damages for personal injury, property damage, and, perhaps, even
emotional distress, are not barred by the rule.  Fourth, some states show little enthusiasm for the
economic-loss rule276 and may determine that it does not apply to cybersecurity cases.  Finally,
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277 See, e.g., Laubmeier, supra note footnote 242, at 235-43 (discussing exceptions in
Wisconsin).
278 See RESTATEMENT, SECOND, OF TORTS § 552B (1977) (allowing recovery of out-of-
pocket losses resulting from negligent misrepresentation).
279 See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 163 (Cal. 1969) (stating that “[a]n attorney
who negligently fails to fulfill a client’s testamentary directions incurs liability in tort for
violating a duty of care owed directly to the intended beneficiaries”). 
280 J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 410 (Cal. 1979) (stating that “[w]here a
special relationship exists between the parties, a plaintiff may recover for loss of expected
economic advantage through the negligent performance of a contract although the parties were
not in contractual privity”). 
281 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 33, at 577 (noting that “[n]o area of tort law is
more unsettled than compensation for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  The decisions
continually restate the criteria for recovery, and there are often substantial differences in the
requirements, or their interpretation, from one jurisdiction to the next, and within any one
jurisdiction at different times”).
282 Cf. Charles E. Cantu, An Essay on the Tort of Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress in Texas:  Stop Saying It Does Not Exist, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 455, 465 (2002)
(discussing the Texas Supreme Court’s retreat from a broad interpretation of the tort).
283 See generally Kimberly Simmons, Recovery for Emotional Distress Based on Fear of
Contracting HIV or AIDS, 59 A.L.R. 5th 535, § 2(a)  (Westlaw 2005) (stating that “[m]ost often
crucial to the success of a claim is whether the particular jurisdiction or court required proof of
actual exposure to a disease-causing agent”).
virtually all states that embrace the economic-loss rule recognize some exceptions.277 For
example, economic damages are routinely recoverable in negligent misrepresentation actions.278 
Many states also allow persons whose legacies are lost due to negligent preparation of a will to
sue to recover those economic damages.279 A court might determine the relationship between a
database possessor and data subject is sufficiently “special”280 to warrant recovery of out-of-
pocket losses resulting from identity theft–notwithstanding the economic-loss rule.  
B.  Emotional-Distress Damages
States differ tremendously in what they say about whether negligently caused emotional
distress is actionable.281 Some jurisdictions hold that such damages may almost never be
recovered,282 while others seem quite willing to entertain claims for psychic suffering caused by
failure to exercise care.
One arena in which a consensus of sorts has emerged are the fear-of-disease cases.283 In
these suits, the plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the defendant’s tortious conduct, he or she was
subjected to emotional distress based on fear of contracting a contagious disease.  Many of the
cases have involved fear of contracting HIV or AIDS, but the precedent extends somewhat
further to fear of cancer and other diseases.
In addressing these claims, courts generally hold that a plaintiff may only recover
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284 See Majca v. Beekil, 701 N.E.2d 1084 (Ill. 1998) (holding that a complaint which
alleged that a dental student was infected with HIV at time he provided treatment failed to state a
cause of action for fear of contracting AIDS, absent an allegation that the patients were actually
exposed to HIV); K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995) (holding that a patient who
did not allege that she was actually exposed to HIV was not in the zone of danger and could not
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress).  See also Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355
(Del. 1995) (holding that damages for emotional distress are recoverable only if underlying
physical injury is shown).  But see Temple-Inland Forest Products Corp. v. Carter, 993 S.W.2d
88 (Tex. 1999) (holding that workers who were exposed to asbestos, but who did not then have
an asbestos-related disease, could not recover damages for fear of developing such a disease in
the future). 
285 But see Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 923 P.2d 1154, 1159 (N.M. 1996)
(permitting recovery without exposure where the plaintiff was negligently allowed to come into
contact with bodily fluids that might have been, but were not, HIV-positive).
286 JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 33, at 579.
287 Compare Johnson v. West Va. Univ. Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 889, 893 (W. Va. 1991)
(permitting recovery where the defendant hospital negligently failed to advise a security officer
that an unruly patient had AIDS, and the patient bit the officer after biting himself), with Potter
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 800 (Cal. 1993) (holding that damages for fear of
cancer in a negligence action are allowed only if the fear stems from a knowledge which is
corroborated by reasonable medical and scientific opinion that it is more likely than not that
cancer will develop in the future due to the toxic exposure). 
288 Ensslin, supra note 9 (explaining that the hackers had access to information about
42,900 persons).
emotional distress damages if the plaintiff was actually “exposed” to the disease.284 Fear of
disease in the absence of exposure is deemed to be unreasonable and therefore not
compensable.285
“Of course the critical question is whether ‘exposed’ means (a) that the defendant had the
disease [when he or she came into contact with the plaintiff], (b) that the circumstances were
such that the disease might have been transmitted, © that it is probable that the plaintiff will
develop the disease, or (d) that the plaintiff in fact contracted the disease.”286 Courts have
differed in answering this question,287 yet the precedent that has emerged in these cases provides
a logical starting point for determining whether a data subject should be able to recover for
emotional-distress losses resulting from unauthorized database intrusion and fear of identity theft
or other harm.  If there is no evidence that the plaintiff’s data was actually accessed by an
intruder, but only a risk of unauthorized access, emotional distress damages, which are
inherently difficult to quantify, ordinarily should be denied.  For example, in some cases the
evidence shows that “hackers appeared to have been more interested in using . . . [a university’s]
computer to download movies and music than to access personal data.”288
In proving that the plaintiff’s personal data were subject to unauthorized access, it may
be appropriate for courts to employ a presumption of unauthorized access.  If the defendant has
allowed or caused the best evidence of exposure to be lost or destroyed, it may be reasonable to
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289 See South Cent. Reg. Med. Ctr. v. Pickering, 749 So. 2d 95 (Miss. 1999), (holding
that if the defendant has allowed or caused the best evidence of exposure to HIV or another
communicable disease to be destroyed, despite the fact that defendant had notice that an issue
existed regarding that evidence, a rebuttable presumption of actual exposure arises in favor of
the plaintiff).
290 See, e.g., Russo v. White, 400 S.E.2d 160, 163 (Va. 1991) (allowing recovery only
where “distress is so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it”)
291 See Preston & Turner, supra note 22, at 459-60 (stating that “[u]nderreporting
computer security incidents is not limited to the U.S.–one European study estimates 30,000 to
40,000 occurred in one European nation, while only 105 official complaints were made”); Wibel,
supra note 12, at 1612 n.170 (stating that reluctance to report security vulnerability in part
reflects “a lack of faith in law enforcement”).
292 See Marc S. Friedman & Kristin Bissinger, Infojacking: Crimes on the Information
Superhighway, 9 NO. 5 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, 2 (1997) (stating that “organizations often
swallow losses quietly rather than notifying the authorities and advertising their vulnerability to
shareholders and clients”).
293 See CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 12, at  35 (stating that
“information in the public domain about the vulnerability of a network could lead to copycat
attacks”); Wibel, supra note 12, at 1578 n.6 (asserting that some companies fear that disclosure
“both invites retributive attacks and highlights vulnerabilities to other hackers”).
294 See Calif. Bill Analysis, Senate Floor, 2001-2002 Regular Session, Assembly Bill
700, Aug. 22, 2002, available in Westlaw at CA B. An., A.B. 700 Sen., 8/22/2002 (discussing
hearings “to explore why . . . [a] breach, which reportedly occurred on April 5, 2002, was not
discovered until May 7, 2002 and employees were not notified until May 21, 2002").
295 See id. (discussing a case where “a former employee sold hundreds of financial
records to an identity theft ring but the company never told its customers”).
296 See note 204, supra, and the accompanying text.
assume that exposure occurred, absent proof to the contrary.  There are fear-of-disease cases that
take this approach.289
In cases involving intentional infliction of emotional distress, courts have been assiduous
in requiring that the distress be severe before it is compensable.290 This severity requirement is
all the more applicable to cases where distress is based upon mere alleged negligence.
Presumably this means that only in rare cases will it be possible for a data subject who does not
suffer physical harm to recover emotional distress damages relating to data intrusion.
C.  Security-Monitoring Damages
Database possessors whose security has been breached are often reluctant to discover and
report such developments291 for fear of triggering adverse publicity, legal liability,292 or increased
attacks by hackers.293 As a result, there is often an undesirable lag between the occurrence of an
intrusion, discovery of that breach, and revelation of the events to data subjects.294 Indeed,
sometimes data subjects are never told.295 Yet, as noted above,296 revelation that a breach of
security has occurred enables data subjects to protect their interests through increased vigilance
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297 See CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 59 (stating that
“[d]isclosure is a common vehicle for consumer protection”); Preston & Turner, supra note 22,
at 460 (stating that “when consumers have notice of unauthorized access to their personal
information, they can take steps to mitigate the potential harm by informing credit reporting
agencies and responding to fraudulent attempts to exploit their good names”).
298 Interagency Guidance, supra note 215.
299 Preston & Turner, supra note 22, at 460.
300 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 51:3074(A), La. Legis. 499 (2005) (“shall, following
discovery of a breach . . . , notify”); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 48.103, Tx. Legis. 294 (2005)
(providing that businesses “shall disclose . . . after discovering or receiving notification of the
breach”).
301 See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 48.201(a), Tx. Legis. 294 (2005) stating that “[a]
person who violates this chapter is liable to the state for a civil penalty of at least $2,000 but not
more than $50,000 for each violation”); id. at § 48.201(e) (allowing recovery of “reasonable
expenses . . . including reasonable attorney’s fees, court costs, and investigatory costs”).
302 LA. REV. STAT. § 51:3072, La. Legis. 499 (2005) (legislative finding).
303 The database possessor should have the duty of proving that the data subject was
notified of the breach or that the possessor did everything reasonable to achieve that result.  This
is especially true where aggregate forms of communication are used to disclose security breaches
to a large class of persons.
against identity theft and other types of harm.297
Notification can also be consistent with a database possessor’s own interests.  Timely
notice to customers may protect a company’s reputation, reduce its risk of legal liability, and
minimize the chances of customer defections. 298 “Requiring businesses to disclose information
security violations [also] provides operators with a market incentive to ensure that their security
is adequate.”299 
State security breach notification laws currently provide only a limited incentive for
database possessors to discover intrusion, because notification obligations are ordinarily based
not upon when the breach should have been discovered, but on actual discovery or notification of
the intrusion.300 In addition, the civil fines that apply to a breach of a general statutory duty to
protect customer information are typically capped at a low amount, which may provide
insufficient inducement for best practices.301
Because “[v]ictims of identity theft must act quickly to minimize . . . damage . . . [and]
expeditious notification of possible misuse of a person’s personal information is imperative,”302
database possessors should be given a legal incentive to discover and report unauthorized
database intrusions.  That incentive could take the form of a limitation on liability.  One
reasonable option would be to cap the database possessor’s exposure to liability at the moment
that the breach is revealed to the data subject.303 Notification could serve as the pivotal factor in
shifting further responsibility (beyond the damages cap) from the data possessor to the data
subject.  Once notice of the security breach is provided, the data subject is in a better position
than the defendant to monitor the risk of harm and to take action against threats to his or her
Page 56
304 See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824-25 (Cal. 1993)
(stating that “the cost of medical monitoring is a compensable item of damages where . . . the
need for future monitoring is a reasonably certain consequence of a plaintiff’s toxic exposure
and that the recommended monitoring is reasonable.  In determining the reasonableness and
necessity of monitoring, the following factors are relevant: (1) the significance and extent of the
plaintiff’s exposure to chemicals; (2) the toxicity of the chemicals; (3) the relative increase in the
chance of onset of disease in the exposed plaintiff as a result of the exposure, when compared to
(a) the plaintiff’s chances of developing the disease had he or she not been exposed, and (b) the
chances of the members of the public at large of developing the disease; (4) the seriousness of
the disease for which the plaintiff is at risk; and (5) the clinical value of early detection and
diagnosis”); Askey v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (App. Div. 1984)
(allowing recovery of medical monitoring damages to “permit the early detection and treatment
of maladies” and holding that “as a matter of public policy the tort-feasor should bear its cost”);
Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Army, 696 A.2d 137, 145 (Pa. 1997) (finding “no
reason to limit common law medical monitoring claims to asbestos-related injuries”); Bower v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 429 (W. Va. 1999) (recognizing a cause of action). 
But see Henry v. Dow Chemical Co., 2005 W.L. 1869555, *4 (Mich.) (holding that medical
monitoring was not a cognizable negligence claim absent physical injury); Badillo v. American
Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 441 (Nev. 2001) (holding that “Nevada common law does not
recognize a cause of action for medical monitoring” and that while a “remedy of medical
monitoring may be available for an underlying cause of action . . . neither party . . . briefed the
issue nor set forth the cause of action to which it would provide a remedy”).
Absent direct exposure to a toxic substance, medical-monitoring damages may be denied. 
See, e.g., Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 628 A.2d 724 (N.J. 1993) (holding that an asbestos worker’s
wife, who was exposed to product only in an indirect manner, was not entitled to recover
medical surveillance damages in a products liability action against manufacturers of asbestos
products). 
305 See, e.g., Carey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Ill.1998)
(predicting Illinois law); Witherspoon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 455, 467
(D.D.C.1997) (recognizing medical monitoring damages under District of Columbia law, but
finding that the plaintiff failed to prove “present injury and a reasonable fear that the present
injury could lead to the future occurrence of disease”). 
306 See Stollenwerk v. TriWest Health Care Alliance, No. 03-0185 PHX SRB (D. Ariz.),
discussed at eplaw.us/news/2005/05/20 (last visited Aug. 9, 2005) (finding that awarding
monitoring fees would promote early detection of identity theft).  See also People v. Ware, 2003
W.L. 22120898, *2 (Cal. Ct. App.) (affirming an award of restitutionary damages against the
perpetrator of identity theft which included “$100 per year for monitoring the adverse
credit and personal security. 
The cap on damages could take the form of limiting liability to an amount equivalent to
the out-of-pocket costs of monitoring security and taking reasonably necessary steps to prevent
identity theft and other losses.  These “security monitoring damages” would be similar in
concept to the medical monitoring damages which some state304 and federal305 courts allow
victims of toxic exposure to recover.  The analogy is apt, as at least one court has found.306 A
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consequences on her credit rating”).
307 See generally RESTATEMENT, SECOND, OF TORTS § 452 cmt. f (1965) (discussing the
shifting of responsibility to a third person).
308 In some cases, a contractual or statutory allocation of responsibilities between
multiple parties is important.  See Goar v. Village of Stephen, 196 N.W. 171 (Minn. 1923)
(holding that the duty to prevent harm had shifted from a power company that negligently
installed electrical lines to a village, which had contractually assumed the obligation of
inspecting the lines); First Assembly of God v. Texas Utilities, 52 S.W.3d 482, 492 (Tex. App.
2001) (holding that where a statutory tariff which provided that “the Customer assumes full
responsibility for electric energy at the point of delivery,” a utility did not have a duty to check
equipment “downstream’ to insure that it was installed and maintained properly).  In other cases,
the determination is a result of a number of factors, such as the degree of danger and the
magnitude of the risk of harm; the character and position of a third person and his or her
relationship to the plaintiff or defendant; the actors’ knowledge of the danger; the likelihood that
someone other than the antecedent tortfeasor would exercise care; amount of time that elapsed
since the original negligence.  See RESTATEMENT, SECOND, OF TORTS § 452 cmt. f (1965)
(discussing factors).  In some cases, the courts seem to implicitly ask whether the defendant did
everything reasonable to prevent the harm from occurring.  See, e.g., Balido v. Improved
Machinery, Inc., 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (App. Ct. 1973) (holding that the responsibility to prevent a
defective machine from causing harm did not shift from the manufacturer, who offered to repair
the machine for $500, to the subsequent party who refused the offer).  See also Kent v.
Commonwealth, 771 N.E.2d 770 (Mass. 2002) (holding that a board’s decision to parole an
inmate pursuant to an INS deportation warrant shifted the duty to prevent harm to the INS);
Braun v. New Hope Twp., 646 N.W.2d 737 (S.D. 2002) (holding that the responsibility to
prevent a motorist’s injuries shifted from farmers who broke a warning sign to a township that
had a duty to erect and maintain warning signs).
309 See footnote 212, supra.
data subject whose personal data has been exposed to a breach of security, like a person who
suffers exposure to a toxic substance, is at risk of further harm.  There is no certainty that the
harm (e.g., identity theft in the case of the data subject or perhaps cancer in the case of the toxic-
exposure victim) will ever occur.  The reasonable and prudent course in light of those risks is to
incur the expenses that are necessary to monitor the risk that harm may develop.  The victim of
the exposure is thereby placed in a position to take prompt action–in one case, to combat the risk
of financial harm and other risks from data misuse, and in the other, to secure necessary medical
care to address a developing illness or condition.
The concept of shifting responsibility is not new to the law.307 There are cases which
hold that there are sometimes good reasons for a court to hold that a party who created a risk is
not a proximate cause of harm that later occurs.308 In these cases, the responsibility for
preventing the harm has shifted from the original tortfeasor to someone else.  While the law has
typically shied away from the rubric of “shifting responsibility,” there are many instances where
tort law has embraced the idea in substance, sometimes dressed in the garb of “duty.”  The rules,
mentioned earlier, which say that a possessor of land need do nothing more than warn a licensee
of known dangers,309 or that in some states a mental health professional treating a dangerous
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310 See footnote 213, supra.
311 The federal government says that victims of data intrusion should “remain vigilant
over the next twelve to twenty-four months.”  Interagency Guidance, supra note 215.  In some
states, the applicable statute of limitations for negligence might be two years, depending on the
nature of the claim.  See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a) & (b) (Westlaw current
through Ch. 290 of the 2005 Reg. Sess. 79th Legislature) (stating that a two-year statute applies
to certain claims for personal injury, property damage, and wrongful death).
312 See generally RESTATEMENT, SECOND, OF TORTS § 448 (1965) (discussing whether
intentionally tortious or criminal conduct breaks the chain of causation).
313 See Parts IV-A and B, supra.
314 See Dash, supra note 10 (discussing a television spot highlighting “Citigroup’s free
identity theft protection services, which include fraud detection warnings on every bank and
credit card account”); McCoy, supra note 38, at 490-91 (stating that, upon learning of the theft
of laptops containing customer information in November 2003, Wells Fargo notified the affected
customers and promised to monitor the at-risk accounts, change the affected account numbers,
add a Credit Alert report to customers’ credit reports, provide 24-hour access to specially trained
account representatives, and provide a one-year membership to a credit-monitoring reporting
service so customers could quickly learn if any of their information was being misused”).  See
also Reddick, supra note 11, at 1 (noting that nine states require businesses to notify consumer-
reporting agencies of security breaches)
patient need only warn the victim or the police,310 are rules that, in effect, shift the burden of
preventing harm from one party to another once a warning is given.
The bargain of capping a cybersecurity plaintiff’s damages at the cost of monitoring
security if the database possessor provides notification of a security breach is not a bad one. 
From the standpoint of the data subject, the plaintiff may be better off with a warning and
reimbursement for the out-of-pocket costs of vigilance, than with gambling on a tort action
against the database possessor.  That suit would be fraught with many obstacles:  a possibly short
statute of limitations,311 if the improperly accessed data is not exploited by the intruder promptly;
a risk that the database possessor’s negligence might not be found to be a proximate cause of
resulting criminal conduct;312 the likelihood that the economic-loss or “exposure” rules may bar
important aspects of damages;313 and the possibility that the court might find that the possessor
had no duty at all.
The bargain is also not bad for database possessors.  Capping damages at the cost of
security-monitoring damages would avoid the risk of catastrophic liability for personal injuries
that sometimes occur; exposure to property-damage claims; and the chance that a court might
narrowly construe the applicability of the economic-loss rule.  Some companies faced with the
risk of liability from loss of personal data have voluntarily chosen to provide affected persons
with a type of security-monitoring protection.314 
Moreover, society would be better off if damages were capped at the cost of security
monitoring in exchange for notification whenever security is breached.  The only way to
minimize the losses related to database intrusions (aside from criminal penalties, which seem not
Page 59
315 See CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 65-66 (describing
available coverage and noting that the “paucity of data on cyberrelated losses makes it difficult
to accurately price cyberinsurance policies”).
316 See Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, Emma K. Burton, & Jennifer L. Groninger,
Medical Monitoring:  Should Tort Law Say Yes?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1057 (1999) (stating
that “the inherent complexities and significant public policy concerns surrounding medical
monitoring awards, which were noted by the United States Supreme Court in Metro-North [521
U. S. 424 (1997)], suggest that the issue ought to be decided by legislatures, not by courts”).
very effective) is to spur investment in data security, discover when intrusions occur, and warn
persons whose interests are at risk.  A cap on damages in exchange for notification of security
breaches would not undercut the incentives database possessors have to invest in data security. 
Companies and others would still be subject to state and federal laws which impose various
sanctions relating to cybersecurity; they would still face the threats of bad publicity and
consumer disaffection resulting from disclosure of security breaches; and at least some
possessors (e.g., credit card companies) would still stand to lose millions of dollars as a result of
fraudulent use of personal information.  However, the damages cap in the form of liability only
for security-monitoring damages would help to ensure that database possessors are not subject to
ruinous tort judgments.  It would create an incentive to discover security breaches and to
internalize the security monitoring costs that those intrusions entail.  Consumers would also be
better able to protect their own interest in the variety of ways discussed above.  In addition, the
cap on damages might also reduce the threat of overburdening already overworked federal and
state courts.  The damages issues in cybersecurity cases would be greatly simplified, and it is
likely that guidance from the courts would quickly define the average costs of security
monitoring, thereby promoting the settlement of cases.  Indeed, limiting liability to security-
monitoring damages is also likely to promote the growth of insurance to cover intruder-related
losses by making the extent of liability more certain and thereby facilitating the pricing of
insurance coverage.315
A damages cap should not apply to cases involving egregious conduct.  A plaintiff who
can establish that the defendant acted with reckless indifference or intentional disregard in
failing to protect data should be able to avoid the limitation on liability.  Similarly, if no
disclosure of a security breach is made, liability for a breach of that duty or of the duty to protect
data should extend as far as the usual rules of tort law allow.
A cap on database possessor liability at the costs of security-monitoring damages could
be legislatively enacted.316 However, in the absence of legislation to the contrary, questions
relating to duty, proximate causation (including shifting responsibility), and damages have been
the traditional province of the courts.  Quite possibly it would be permissible under state law, for
the courts to determine that if a database possessor negligently fails to protect computerized
personal information, there is no legal obligation other than to pay for security monitoring
damages, if the breach is revealed to the data subject.
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V. Conclusion:  Security in Insecure Times
Modern society is built on fragile foundations of computerized personal data.  If this
society is to endure and prosper, then those foundations must be vigilantly safeguarded.  Tort
law offers an appropriate legal regime for allocating the risks and spreading the costs of database
intrusion-related losses.  Tort law can also be employed to create incentives, on the part of both
data possessors and data subjects, to minimize the losses associated with breaches of database
security.  Courts and legislatures must consider carefully the role of tort liability in protecting the
computerized foundations of modern society.  If those who make and interpret the laws are too
hasty in concluding that database possessors are not liable for losses occasioned by unauthorized
data access–whether because there is no duty, no proximate causation, or no recoverable
damages–important opportunities to reduce and distribute the costs of computerized technology
will be lost.  If liability is too readily assessed, important institutions will be adversely affected,
and with them the prosperity of modern society.  Security in insecure times requires a sensitive
balancing of competing interests.  Established tort principles carefully applied to the
contemporary problems of cybersecurity and identity theft can perform a key role in protecting
the economic foundations of modern life.
